Celo Governance Guild | Season 2 Funding Request

Governance Governance Proposals
,
1

Proposal Key Aspects

  • Receiver Entity: Celo Governance
  • Status: [DRAFT]
  • Author(s): 0xj4an-work (@0xj4an-work), Wade (@Wade), Goldo (@0xGoldo)
  • Type of Request: Funding
    • Intent: Season 2
    • Funding Category: Governance Operations
    • Funding Request: We are requesting from the Community Fund 60,400 USDm equivalent to 532,000 Celo (using the payment terms described in the desired section) for one (1) year of operations.

1. Summary

This proposal requests funding for the continuation and operation of the Celo Governance Guild during the 2026 governance year. The Governance Guild (formerly CGP Editors) serves as a neutral governance operations layer, supporting proposal lifecycle coordination, governance calls, documentation, and proposer assistance across Celo Governance.

If approved, this funding will ensure continuity, accountability, and operational stability for governance processes while aligning with Celo’s broader decentralization strategy and the evolution of the Celo governance framework.

Brief History

Since Celo mainnet genesis and the deployment of the original core contracts, Celo Governance has operated as a community-governed system. While on-chain voting is performed by diverse stakeholders, governance effectiveness relies on a neutral administrative layer that coordinates communication, documentation, and process execution.

Historically, this work was performed by volunteers, with early guidance from Foundation contributors. Over time, and by design, Foundation involvement has been reduced to promote decentralization.

More recently, governance-related work under the Celo Governance Guild demonstrated that critical protocol governance work requires compensation to remain sustainable, accountable, and resilient.

2. Motivation

Governance as Critical Infrastructure

As Celo governance has matured, proposal volume, complexity, and coordination requirements have increased. Governance operations can no longer rely on informal or volunteer-only structures without risking delays, burnout, or process inconsistency.

Funding the Governance Guild ensures:

  • Continuity of governance operations
  • Preservation of institutional memory
  • Consistent proposal quality and process integrity
  • Reduced reliance on Foundation bandwidth

Responsibility, Accountability, and Compensation

Compensation has materially improved accountability and diligence. Formalizing governance operations allows contributors to approach proposals with rigor, consistency, and neutrality benefiting proposers, voters, and the broader ecosystem.

Independence and Separation of Powers

Celo Governance Guardians act as neutral stewards and advisors, not beneficiaries of the initiatives they oversee. To avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest, governance operations should not be embedded as a line item within the same operational budgets they supervise.

This proposal advances a parallel-but-collaborative model, where governance operations are independently funded while maintaining close coordination with governance stakeholders. This approach future proofs governance against role overlap and cultural drift as contributors rotate over time.

3. Specification

The Governance Guild will operate as a neutral governance operations body, explicitly not a political or decision-making entity.

Core responsibilities include:

1. Governance Call Operations

  • Schedule planning and governance calls (Google Meet + Lemonade)
  • Publish forum posts and GitHub issues for agendas
  • Maintain governance calendars and deadlines
  • Host and moderate governance calls
  • Record, document, and publish call notes

2. Proposal Lifecycle Support

  • Track governance proposals on the forum and GitHub
  • Provide early feedback and process guidance to proposers
  • Ensure proposals follow CGP templates and requirements
  • Support on-chain proposal submissions when needed

3. Documentation & Reporting

  • Maintain the Celo Governance GitHub repository
  • Publish governance summaries and updates
  • Draft the weekly Governance section of the Celo Signal Newsletter
  • Track governance process improvements and share recommendations

4. Community Enablement

  • Lower barriers for new proposers
  • Direct contributors to relevant governance documentation
  • Improve transparency and voter awareness

4. Metrics and KPIs

The Governance Guild’s performance in 2026 will be evaluated using:

Operational Metrics

  • Number of governance calls hosted
  • % of calls documented and published within 72 hours
  • Average response time to proposer requests

Proposal Quality

  • % of proposals submitted without procedural rework
  • Reduction in last-minute proposal issues

Participation & Transparency

  • Number of unique proposers supported
  • Governance call attendance
  • Consistency of weekly governance communications

Process Integrity

  • Adherence to governance timelines
  • Public availability of documentation and records

5. Current Status

The Governance Guild already exists and is operational.

This proposal is a continuity request, not a new initiative. It builds directly on the previously approved Governance Guild proposal and aligns with Celo’s decentralization roadmap by enabling stakeholders to operate in parallel rather than hierarchically.

6. Timeline and Milestones

Celo Governance Guild Operations Scope

  1. Schedule Planning Governance Calls
    • Schedule Planning Governance Call in Google Meet
  2. Host and attend Planning Governance Calls
    • Host and attend Planning Governance Call in Google Meet
  3. Schedule Governance Calls
    • Schedule Governance Call in Google Meet.
    • Post Forum Post in Governance Call Category in the Celo Forum.
    • Open a GitHub Issue in the Celo Governance Repository.
    • Schedule Governance Call in Lemonade to avoid bots or unauthorized people to join.
      • This also allows us to build a Subscription List.
    • Schedule Governance Call in Discord pointing to Lemonade to increase visibility.
    • Schedule CGP deadlines (last 6 hours) for submitting votes on Celo Signal calendar, and the general voting period.
  4. Collect proposals for the next Call
  5. Host Governance Calls
    • The host of each Governance Call is randomly assigned between the Celo Guardians, depending on the availability of each one.
  6. Draft the Celo Signal Newsletter
    • Every Friday, there is a need to draft the Governance Chapter of the Celo Signal Newsletter.
      • Adding and removing links to necessary CGPs.
      • Raise awareness about upcoming proposals and work to drive voter turnout.
  7. Update the GitHub Repository after the Call
  8. Review and approve PRs
  9. Provide Forum support and input
    • Provide initial feedback and guidance to proposals on the Celo Forum.
    • Point proposers to the right documents and guides to help them better understand Celo Governance.
    • Take notes on areas where Celo governance could be improved and share these documents with other Guardians.
  10. Help with OnChain Proposals Submissions
    • Help proposers to submit their proposals OnChain.

7. Detailed Budget

2026 H1

Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Total
Celo Governance Guild Lead 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 13,200
Celo Guardian 1 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 8,250
Celo Guardian 2 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 8,250
Celo Guardian Advisor
(No compensation) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Celo Governance Guild Legal Entity Expenses 1,000 - - - - - 1,000
Total 5,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 30,700

2026 H2

Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Total
Celo Governance Guild Lead 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 13,200
Celo Guardian 1 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 8,250
Celo Guardian 2 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 8,250
Celo Guardian Advisor
(No compensation) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 4,950 29,700

The Celo Governance Guardians compensation is calculated based on a weekly working effort of 25 for leading and 20 for regular guardians. Hours denominated in $cUSD

The Budget will be managed in a Multi Sign designed to have three members part of the proposal and one member from the Celo Foundation (TBA) in guarantee of good working conditions.

Multisign Address (Threshold 2/3):
0xc733285e8e4db433d4cd641f99C46Bf108DCb54F

Signers:

  • 0xj4an: 0xFEF5A1A2b3754A2F53161EaaAcb3EB889F004d4a
  • 0xgoldo: 0xCa45F69c4611C75a22090b5FFdc94dcdbbAd1C3d
  • zoz: 0x3fA757A1bA226B52dF46769631c66356151fa4ac

8. Payment Terms

Two payments (One each semester) with the total budget of each semester that will cover Celo Governance Guild compensation, training, and community engagement initiatives. Payments will be distributed monthly, with performance-based reviews to ensure the program’s objectives are met effectively.

The payment will be in Celo due to the Community Fund contract holding the majority of available funds in CELO. We use a 90-day rolling average to determine the price, which smooths out short-term volatility and provides a fair valuation for grant disbursement.

Based on this 90-day average, Celo is valued at approximately $0.151 USD, implying that to fully cover the requested $60,400 USD budget, approximately 401,000 - 414,000 Celo would be required (including a ~3% buffer for price movement and execution). However, when testing a real swap on-chain using the USDm/Celo pool, the executable rate is currently ~8.55 Celo per 1 USDm (≈$0.117 per Celo). At this rate, approximately 516,000 Celo would be needed to realize the full $60,400 USD budget. We are therefore requesting ~532,000 Celo, aligning with the current executable on-chain rate plus a ~3% buffer for price movement.

Presenting both the 90-day average and the real-time executable price ensures transparency for governance and guarantees that the program is properly funded regardless of market depth or execution slippage.

9. Team

Led by 0xj4an-work (@0xj4an-work), Wade (@Wade), and Goldo (@0xGoldo).
The team will receive guidance from the Celo Foundation.

10. Additional Support/Resources

5 Likes
Celo Governance Call #83 | Jan 29th, 2026
Celo Governance Call #83 | Jan 29th, 2026
2

Noticed a minor typo: Treshold should be 2/3 (or just 2)

(Celo Mainnet address details for 0xc733285e8e4db433d4cd641f99C46Bf108DCb54F | Blockscout)

3

Thank you, @clemens, for your observation. Yes, it was a minor typo. The content has already been edited.

1 Like
4

I strongly oppose this funding request.

Over the past year, the Governance Guild has performed so poorly that I no longer believe it can be trusted to operate as a neutral or competent governance body. At this point, the damage is structural, not incidental. I therefore believe the correct course of action is to disband the Governance Guild entirely and reconstitute it afresh with new members, rather than fund “continuity” of a failed setup.

The Guild has repeatedly demonstrated a lack of understanding of Celo’s own governance rules and procedures. These are not obscure edge cases or ambiguous interpretations: they are core governance mechanics. I have personally pointed out basic rule violations and process errors several times over the past year. A body whose sole mandate is to guide proposers, enforce process, and safeguard governance integrity cannot itself repeatedly misunderstand the rules it is meant to uphold. That alone should be disqualifying.

The claim of neutrality made throughout this proposal is not credible. Neutrality is not something you assert, it is something you structurally guarantee. All current members of the Governance Guild are CCF recipients through other entities, and some members may have previously been employed by core ecosystem actors, like the Celo Foundation. These are not trivial relationships. They are direct financial and institutional ties to entities that routinely participate in governance.

You cannot plausibly claim neutrality while simultaneously:

  • Being financially entangled with frequent governance proposers
  • Advising, guiding, and procedurally validating proposals from organizations you are or were connected to

This is not a theoretical concern. Governance outcomes have already been tainted by these conflicts multiple times this year.

The most serious issue is that the Governance Guild acts as an approved gatekeeper on the governance GitHub repository: the canonical source of proposals that are referenced on-chain. This is real power, not clerical work. The ability to approve or delay PRs, determine procedural validity, and shape what enters the governance record means the Guild directly influences governance outcomes. Any entity holding that authority must be entirely free of conflicts of interest, past or present. The current Guild does not meet that standard. The procedural tainting of CGP 216, 217 and 218 is in itself evidence of the above deficiency.

The argument that compensation improved accountability is unconvincing. What the past year has actually shown is that compensation without independence entrenches incumbency, operational authority without accountability enables governance capture, and “continuity” becomes a shield against scrutiny rather than a benefit to the community. This is not neutral infrastructure, it is institutional drift. For these reasons, I propose that the Governance Guild be fully disbanded and reconstituted from scratch. A new governance operations body must be built with strict conflict-of-interest rules (including past affiliations), clear term limits, explicit accountability mechanisms, and no concurrent Community Fund funding relationships. Members should be selected transparently and approved by the community, not grandfathered in under the banner of continuity.

Only under those conditions can the following responsibilities be trusted again:

  • Providing process guidance to proposers
  • Ensuring proposals follow CGP templates and requirements
  • Supporting on-chain proposal submissions
  • Approving and merging PRs into the governance repository

I urge the community to reject this funding request and instead support a motion to disband and rebuild the Governance Guild with integrity, independence, and competence at its core.

3 Likes
5

Thank you for taking the time to put together a detailed critique @yomfana. Scrutiny is part of healthy governance, and concerns around neutrality, accountability, and process integrity are worth discussing openly.

That said, the comment above blends governance operations with governance power, and the suggested remedy (disbanding and rebuilding) would materially weaken Celo governance at a time when throughput and complexity are already high.

1) Governance operations are not discretionary power

The Governance Guild does not create rules, interpret policy based on preference, or influence governance outcomes. The role is operational:

  • applying existing, community-approved governance rules
  • ensuring proposals conform to published CGP requirements
  • coordinating calls, timelines, documentation, and on-chain submission mechanics

Merging or approving a GitHub PR is not political authority. It is a procedural step based on objective criteria that are public and reviewable. If something does not meet requirements, it is returned with requested changes. If it meets requirements, it is merged.

If there were specific errors in the CGP 216 - 218 process (or elsewhere), the most productive path is to document them concretely and address them individually. Broad claims like “structural incompetence” are hard to action without specific examples and proposed fixes.

2) Neutrality does not mean ecosystem isolation

Neutrality in a mature DAO is primarily structural. It does not require governance operators to have zero ecosystem involvement. That standard would make governance operations difficult to staff in practice and would likely reduce competence rather than improve neutrality.

Celo’s governance environment is specialized and technically demanding. The people able to run governance operations effectively are often long-term contributors who understand the protocol, the forum, and the tooling. The relevant question is whether there is undisclosed discretionary influence.

The Governance Guild:

  • does not vote
  • does not approve or reject proposals on subjective grounds
  • does not benefit from proposal outcomes, beyond the continuation of governance operations itself

Participation in other Community Fund proposals is not automatically a conflict of interest. If the community wants clearer disclosure expectations or additional safeguards, that is a constructive discussion. But treating any ecosystem involvement as disqualifying risks privileging disengagement over competence.

3) Reconstitution is not neutral, and it is not cost-free

Disbanding and rebuilding governance operations from scratch carries immediate and significant costs:

  • loss of institutional memory
  • onboarding and transition delays during active governance cycles
  • increased friction for proposers and reviewers
  • increased reliance on Foundation or ad hoc fallback support (the opposite direction of decentralization)

Continuity here is not about entrenchment. It is about operational reliability while continuing to improve the process.

4) Accountability can be strengthened without disruption

This proposal already includes defined responsibilities, documentation, and reporting expectations. If additional safeguards are desired, they can be added without dismantling the system currently doing the work, for example:

  • clearer conflict disclosures
  • rotating reviewers for repo operations
  • explicit SLAs and public post-mortems when process issues occur
  • term-based reauthorization tied to measurable outcomes

We welcome concrete suggestions along these lines.

5) Participation improves outcomes

Operational issues are resolved fastest when they are raised with specifics and discussed in governance calls and retrospectives where the full context is available. Forum feedback is valuable, and continuing the conversation in calls and working sessions is often the quickest path from critique to improvement.

In summary: This proposal funds governance operations, not governance authority. The Governance Guild’s role is to apply existing rules transparently and keep the governance process running at scale. Replacing the current operations team wholesale mid-cycle would introduce instability, slow decision-making, and likely centralize responsibilities elsewhere.

We appreciate the concerns raised and are open to improvements. We do not believe disbandment is a responsible or proportional response to the issues cited.

2 Likes
6

This is either deliberately misleading or a profound misunderstanding of power in decentralized systems. Control over timing, process, and the canonical record is the most potent power in decentralized governance. Deciding what meets “objective criteria” when a proposal is ready, and what enters the official repository directly shapes what the community votes on. Every serious governance system recognizes this as real authority.

The procedural controversies around these proposals are public record. A neutral, competent operations body would proactively address such cited failures, not demand the community re-prove them. But since you insist, let’s recount your specific, unaddressed failures that I hope you will NOW address:

  1. On the Regional Council proposal v2, I provided on-chain timestamps and objective evidence straight from governance docs proving the proposal violated the minimum re-submission threshold. You replied to the very next comment in that thread, clearly saw my argument, and chose to ignore it. Could you explain this sequence of actions?
  2. On CGP 216-218, I tagged you directly on my delegate thread highlighting a violation: there was an explicit commitment to immediate re-submission if the vote failed quorum, which was disregarded. Can you credibly prove through governance rules or precedence that this is explicitly allowed? I received no acknowledgement.
  3. On CGP 216 - 218 the proposals also included the text "No" votes will not be counted for the purpose of picking a winning choice, therefore voters can explicitly abstain by voting "no" on all three options. "No" votes do not affect quorum" . This is blatantly false. No votes do count towards quorum. This statement, left uncorrected by the Guild, directly misled voters and potentially caused disenfranchisement. Why was it published?
  4. Can you credibly prove through BOTH forum text and governance calls (recorded timestamps) that CGP 218 was discussed sufficiently to be accepted as a valid proposal? The records suggests otherwise.

The issue is concurrent financial entanglement, not familiarity with Celo. You are receiving Community Fund money through other entities while simultaneously acting as the procedural gatekeepers for proposals competing for that same pool. That is a prima facie conflict of interest. It does not require malicious intent. It does not disappear through disclosure. Conflict of interest is a binary state: either you are financially entangled with proposers, or you are not.

Your argument against reconstitution is a classic appeal to the sunk cost fallacy, used by every failing institution to avoid accountability. You list the “costs of change” but ignore the catastrophic and ongoing cost of a distrusted, conflicted governance layer: eroded community trust. If your operations are as documented and transparent as you claim, a new team should pick up the playbook. If they cannot, it proves the Guild has centralized knowledge rather than decentralized it.

You suggest that safeguards like clearer conflict rules or term limits could be added. That argument only underscores the criticism. A competent, neutral governance body would have treated strict conflict rules and rotation as foundational, not optional add-ons introduced only after public challenge. Their absence is not an accident; it is evidence of poor institutional design.

Most community members rely on the forum’s permanent, transparent record. Governance accountability must be forum-based visible to all and not on synchronous calls. More fundamentally, the Guild is asking for community funding. The burden is on the Guild to demonstrate competence and neutrality to earn that funding.

1 Like
7

Thank you for your detailed and specific feedback, @yomfana You’ve raised substantive concerns that deserve direct answers rather than general responses. Let us address each one:

You’re raising a fair point. Procedural gatekeeping is a form of authority, we shouldn’t pretend otherwise. The relevant questions are:

  1. Is this authority exercised transparently with documented criteria?
  2. Are decisions reviewable and contestable?
  3. What checks exist?

Currently, our criteria for PR acceptance are based on these guidelines for proposal formats. Any rejection or delay can be challenged publicly on the forum. We don’t have unilateral power to pass any proposal, only to verify procedural readiness before community vote.

We acknowledge these guidelines need updating to reflect the move to a Seasonal structure. We commit to publishing a clearer, consolidated set of rules that includes a readiness checklist template for each PR, so “objective criteria” is demonstrable rather than implicit. This documentation is already in progress.

That said, we take your point that procedural roles still create influence over timing and framing. What structural changes would make this authority more accountable in your view? Options might include multiple independent reviewers, public logs of all gatekeeping decisions with rationale, or rotation of this role.

You’re correct that you posted timestamp evidence in that thread and we responded to a subsequent comment without addressing your concern directly. That was an oversight on our part, and we apologize for not engaging with your argument. Let us address it now:

The proposal failed 11 of Aug and another discussion was opened on 2nd of Sep, they DID NOT submit for a vote until the 9th of Oct.

This was then discussed on 4th of September at governance call 76 leaving ample time for continued discussion and incorporation of feedback before final submission to vote on the 9th of October. That is 59 days later and it aligns with a 28 days cooldown period without submitting the proposal.

CGP 216-218 Issues

On the commitment to immediate re-submission: You’re correct that proposal text promising procedural outcomes (like guaranteed re-submission timelines) shouldn’t override governance rules. In hindsight, we should have flagged this language before the proposal went to vote. The actual outcome, the proposal passing with clear support, meant this commitment was never tested, but that doesn’t excuse the oversight. Procedural accuracy should be outcome-independent, and we’ll apply that standard going forward.

On the “No votes do not affect quorum” text: You are correct that this statement was inaccurate, No votes do count toward quorum. This was an error that should have been caught and corrected before publication. We take responsibility for this oversight.

On CGP 218 discussion sufficiency: The timeline was extensive:

Three months of active discussion, multiple iterations, and extended deliberation. We acknowledge the quorum language error and should have had more scrutiny on that wording. However, the claim of insufficient discussion doesn’t align with the record. The feedback and discussion across forum posts was extensive, with substantive input from multiple perspectives. Given the genuine contention, we worked to ensure all viewpoints had opportunity to be heard before moving forward. We believe we did our best to satisfy all stakeholders during a difficult discussion.

Conflict of Interest

You make a fair structural point. We want to be clear about the current situation:

  • Wade - Prezenti
  • 0xj4an - Community Guild
  • 0xGoldo - Community Guild
  • Anna - Celo Foundation (Does not receive compensation from this proposal and acts in advisory role. This role does not merge PRs and was formerly held by Eric Nakagawa and other members of Celo Foundation in the past and is primarily to assist with coordination).

We understand the sunk cost critique. Our concern isn’t “we’ve invested too much to change” it’s operational continuity during transition. However, you make a valid point: if our documentation is truly robust, handoff should be feasible. We are willing to support a structured transition process if the community determines that’s the appropriate path.

We’d also welcome anyone interested in contributing to governance operations to get involved. Whether that’s joining the current structure or helping design a better one. This work has historically struggled to attract contributors, and more participation would strengthen whatever model the community chooses.

Agreed. All substantive governance decisions and justifications should be documented on the forum as the permanent public record. Governance calls should supplement, not substitute for, forum accountability. We commit to ensuring that any position the Guild takes is documented in writing here.

We recognize that trust, once eroded, must be rebuilt through demonstrated action rather than promises. Following the Season 2 proposal process, we commit to implementing the following for Season 3:

  • Updated and consolidated governance guidelines reflecting the Seasonal structure
  • A readiness checklist template for each PR to make acceptance criteria demonstrable
  • Public logs of gatekeeping decisions with documented rationale
  • A review of conflict-of-interest safeguards and recusal procedures

We welcome further suggestions on structural improvements from the community.

2 Likes
8

Hello all confirming my address for the multisig
0xFEF5A1A2b3754A2F53161EaaAcb3EB889F004d4a

9

Hello all confirming my address for the multisig: 0x3fA757A1bA226B52dF46769631c66356151fa4ac

1 Like
11

Hi! I confirm my address for the Multisig: 0xCa45F69c4611C75a22090b5FFdc94dcdbbAd1C3d

1 Like