It’s clear the approach here looks like throwing ideas at the wall until one sticks; a kind of trial-and-error governance.
That claim reads as speculative (even gaslighty) and, in places, misleading. The posts cited are questioning the logic of the extreme (often because the proposers offer arbitrary numbers). Real consensus would be demonstrated by a clear, reproducible signal (for example, a survey or written statements from a majority of validator operators) and not an interpretation of scattered comments.
There is also this gem from the other post that I cannot resist posting:
At the same time the proposers are:
- Proposing to cut funding to many competing providers
- Suggesting subjective scoring to decide who remains
- Ignoring on-chain analyses and community data that dismantle their narrative
- Pushing forward despite substantial community concerns about methodology and fairness
To reiterate, In its current form the proposal is not a serious, defensible reform:
- Technically flawed: several core numerical assumptions are inflated or incorrect, and community on-chain analyses have corrected those claims.
- Strategically incoherent: the rationale shifts across posts without a single, coherent evidence-backed plan.
- Potentially self-serving: the proposers and their projects have been among the largest material recipients of ecosystem funding this year, yet the proposal contains no safeguards against redirection of savings to affiliated parties.
- Dismissive of opposition: parts of the thread treat contested claims as settled and downplay rigorous critique.
Put bluntly: without binding, on-chain guardrails this proposal functions like a blank cheque. If the proposers genuinely care about CELO price stability and long-term inflation, they should accompany any vote with concrete safeguards:
- Publish full proposer disclosures: past and present community grants, validator ownership or operational roles.
- Lock governance controls that could be used to divert resources: transfer
UnreleasedProxyownership into a verifiable governance timelock in a way that prevents discretionary collateral transfers for at least five years (except for pre-defined base CELO yields to lockers). Ideally transferring timelock ownership to the zero address to prevent CGP override. - Publish a thorough impact analysis: how the change affects governance participation, network resilience, RPC availability, and the flow of funding to public goods (validators who reinvest rewards into public goods, opensource tooling and community initatives).
These are standard governance-hygiene measures to prevent capture and to protect the network’s legitimacy. If the proposers are serious about improving tokenomics, they should be the first to endorse similar or better safeguards.