Celo Governance Guidelines and Public Goods Funding Strategy H1 2024 (Revised)

Luuk, thanks for your effort so far. I have a few improvements to propose. But I have a serious concern that the current design won’t solve the frustrations that community members have with the Celo governance and that triggered the whole discussion in the first place. It will be much easier to discuss my concern live and hence I will discuss it during the Jan 19 governance call and if needed, provide a detailed writeup (time consuming task :wink: ) in the forum.

It looks like you & cLabs are getting deeper with Mento proposal implementation details. Hence I will share my improvement proposal now hoping to save your time, cLab’s time and Mento Labs’s time.

I see the problem that Mento proposal is trying to solve and I like the direction. However, the current solution is 1-time 1-currency (cUSD) only solution. I like to propose a long-term multi-currency solution.

The solution is 1) Celo Community Fund selects Mento Labs as the designated minter for any currency that Mento Labs supports now (cUSD, cEuro, cReal) and will support in the future (currency used in Africa, South America?). 2) Proposals can request any currency that Mento Labs supports at the time of proposal submission. 3) Mento Labs will use the large amount minting process to mint CELO into requested currency. The conversion ratio can be defined using last 30 days average price. 4) Celo Community Fund will send CELO tokens to Mento Labs wallet address and Mento Labs will send converted currency to multi-sig.

The solution is also good for Mento Labs. Mento Labs is in the process of issuing its own token and as a Celo community member, I like to see Mento Labs succeeds. Right now, it will make Mento Labs looks bad for Celo governance to ask Mento Labs to take the risk it decided not to take. The reason that Menlo Labs likes to return 120M CELO tokens back to Celo Community Fund is that it decided not to use CELO as collateral which is a wise decision given the market sentiment due to Luna crash. $10 cUSD will increase cUSD supply by 30% based on current $30M cUSD supply. That’s significant and Mento Labs should not take on that risk at the moment (side benefit: no need to do risk assessment right now as discussed in the current solution). With the long-term multi-currency solution, Mento Labs will have a committed long-term customer - Celo Community Fund, which will drive up the supply of all currencies continuously without incurring significant risk. This will be a much better strategy for the long-term success of Mento Labs and its up-coming token launch.


Hi :wave: not to shill the fact that im a woman, but think I could also be a good fit for a public goods steward.

I have dedicated my career to exploring and building blockchain solutions, particularly in public goods funding infrastructure. Most notably at Gitcoin where I led the technical development of the Public Goods Network - an L2 dedicated to funding public goods through sequencer fees.

In my role, I fostered a community of passionate partners, builders, and alliance members dedicated to funding public goods. Some of these alliance members include Protocol Labs, Giveth, Public Nouns, Hedgey, Octant, Hypercerts, Endaoment, Clr.fund, Optimism RetroPGF, and more.

Needless to say, I know what it takes to allocate resources towards public goods in an efficient, coordinated manner that supports the growth of an ecosystem.

PGN is officially winding down (can read more about it here) and I’m looking to dedicate my time and energy towards a new ecosystem that can properly fund public goods. I believe Celo is the perfect fit given its values, users, and community.

Let me know if you need further details! Super excited about this proposal :slight_smile:


Hi Henry, thanks for taking the time to write up some of your thoughts!

Happy to take any questions on the Governance call this Friday. I’ll open up with an overview of the proposed changes, and we can discuss them there. Regardless, leaving your comments on the documents and Forum is likely better; that way, comments will be captured well and can be taken into account better.

This proposal aims to address current needs as efficiently as possible. The reality is that the vast majority of Celo Community Treasury-funded groups account for and operate in USD. To ensure operations without adding pressure on the CELO markets, having cUSD is the most practical solution. In case this changes and in the future, proposers repeatedly request funding in another cStable; the Community Treasury can decide to swap some cUSD for those cStables.

I don’t share your perspective on the risk transfer, as Mento has already committed to return the CELO following CGP102. Even after the transfer, CELO will still make up a significant share of about 30% of the Mento reserve, as shown in the simulation. Reducing pressure on the CELO markets is a good thing for Mento and cStable users, as it wants it’s collateral to remain valuable. In addition, the proposal includes a rebalancing effort to ensure all cStables are more than 100% backed by Stablecoins.

Your mention of the LUNA crash is also irrelevant in this case, and strengthens the argument for the Mento separation and keeping CELO in the Mento Reserve.

Terra was an algorithmic stablecoin, which is fundamentally different from the cStable design. No Stablecoin or diverse collateral was backing Terra, and as such, it was entirely dependent on LUNA. That is not the case at all for cStables, which are fully backed by Stablecoins in addition to ETH, BTC, and CELO.


Hi Sophia, It’s a bummer to see PGN close down, but I think you’ve come to the right place!

Your background and interests seem aligned, and I’m eager to explore how and where you could fit in. Let’s connect later this or early next week.


The problem I see here is that if we start to give cUSD to approved proposals, off ramping them will be hard and the only solution with enough liquidity that I see today is cUSD ->Celo>USD.

Am I missing something?


MentoV2 allows cUSD → USDC via axlUSDC. You can find a description of this route in this article on MentoV2 improvements


Although we would aim to keep as much of the cUSD circulating as possible, there are sufficient ways to off-ramp the cUSD to USDC for teams to do that freely without causing any issues. It’s something we also took into account for the Public Goods Budget!


Luuk, we are in agreement that we need to support the requests for cUSD as I said clearly in my previous reply. That’s why I am not against the idea but propose an improvement. Can you give me a clear reason why my improvement proposal, long-term multi-currency solution, does not solve the problem you raised?

We already have requests for another currency for example cEURO, 2M cEURO by Credit Collective. Can you give me a clear reason why we need to defer solving the problem, and use another governance improvement vote?

Again, I like to see Mento Labs succeeds. I don’t believe Mento Labs should take additional risks before its token launch, and a long-term committed customer that continuously drive up supply of all currencies is a better strategy. Since the discussion should focus on Celo Community Fund, the Mento Labs benefits are secondary, and not quite relevant. So let’s just agree that we have different views.


Hello community,

I want to be a steward under the structure that @LuukDAO has developed and proposed here.

I’m Aaron Boyd, software engineer, start-up founder, and grumpy old man actually reading the content of governance proposals in the forum.

Relevant experience

  • Genesis validator on the network (different company) and current validator for Atalma supported by the Foundation delegated vote program
  • Built the Vido node vizualization tool for the network (supported by a CCF1 grant a couple of years ago)
  • One of three stewards since 2022 of the current Celo Community Fund disbursement mechanisms for small and medium projects - Prezenti


  • I was part of the original complaint about poor governance and have worked with @LuukDAO in the governance working group, although mostly in a consultative manner - @LuukDAO has done most of the research and legwork to bring this to the community here.

Prezenti v3 and it’s place under this proposal

  • Prezenti has been subsumed into this proposal as a pre-existing ecosystem provider for managing a portion of the public goods budget (Celo Camp shares the same position, for the "Mini Pay / incubator community role). Before this proposal was more formed, we had intended to go directly to governance for a third tranche of funds with a more radically stringent disbursement philosophy, but decided to work within the structures that were being developed rather than acting independently.
  • We think we’ve done a good job of disbursing the funds responsibly and securely over the past year and a half, and would ask for the community’s support in this budget outlined in this proposal
  • Would propose that we continue to operate independently as Prezenti and as the recipients of one of the line items in the proposed budget. Probably: “Celo Project Incubation” and/or “Celo Grants and RPFs” - will verify what makes the most sense here

Personal thoughts on this proposal

The good:

  • Short term (half year) consolidated budgeting makes a lot of sense given the highly dynamic stage this protocol is in
  • Consolidated budgeting is sorely needed as there are too many damn DAOs and regional sub-committees and clubs all working independently. I welcome any effort at coalescing around a protocol strategy. Without a clear thought-leadership plan to group around, budget priorities are a coarse proxy for strategy but it’s a start. Anyone with qualms about the size or scope of any particular line item here should make their voice heard with active participation.
  • Separating protocol-level governance concerns from ecosystem spend requests makes a lot of sense. Most of the cLabs proposals no one understands the payload but just assumes they know what they are doing. Good to separate them.
  • Rule tweaks like bond amount and cooldown periods for failed proposals are things I proposed and I would be glad to see some improvements to cleanliness here

The bad:

  • I know Celo was founded as a teal organisation, but we seriously need an org-chart showing who populates each of the ecosystem entities under this new proposal, what their responsibilities are, who is accountable, multi-sign ownership, what their compensation and expected output and commitment is. Who has a say over what and why? Are they elected? This should be dynamic and updated constantly. I have a tingling there’s some large overlap in personnel that I think should be made super clear.
  • Same comment, but for technical ownership. If we’re doing this decentralization thing, who controls this forum, who controls Snapshot (if we use this), who manages and controls Discord, etc.
  • Sankey diagram showing flow of funds for this H1 budget would be cool also. I keep complaining about this so I should make it myself.
  • I question the utility of all the regional DAOs and I would like to see these seriously reconsidered in future budgets

Overall comments on proposal:

  • No proposal is going to be perfect but this is a good start in my opinion. Someone has put in the work to make some changes and there’s been very little offered in alternatives so far. No action is a community choice too, and I’m voting for moving forward with action.
  • Any individual line-item is not permanent, we don’t even know what L2 Celo is landing on. Let’s see how we proceed and then re-convene.

PGF stewarding: personal philosophy

  • Disillusioned and saddened with industry-wide DAO-looting. We’ve all seen it, and I believe there are concentrated attacks on all grants, development, and PGF budgets across the ecosystem. “Trust me bro” does not cut it anymore, and in an industry built on cryptographic proofs is patently absurd. I will continue to question spurious claims, outputs, and relationships.
  • Will prioritize that any community-funded efforts give back to the community; open source over closed, open access over hyper-local initiatives, open usage over tollbooths, and so on.
  • For tiebreaks and difficult decisions will defer to a mandate based on the philosophy of centre-left economist Paul Samuelson.
  • My commitment will be part-time as I have other full-time work, and I want to act in an overseer / board-member style capacity.

Thanks for getting this far. Excited to be a part of the community.


Thanks, @Thylacine, for your valuable input, as always!

I’ll try to produce as many of these org charts and diagrams in the coming days and, in addition, welcome you as a Steward and have your support in making it as easy for any Celo stakeholder to grasp and evaluate value flow, control, and structure.



I made a diagram for myself to get a handle on what’s documented in the “Celo Public Goods” part of this (three-part) proposal.

The HTML is available here: https://celo-pgf-budget-h1-2024-sankey.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/CELO-Public-Goods-Budget-H1-2024.html if you want to dynamically hover over the elements and so on to read the values.

Here’s the TL;dr version of what the overall proposal is (for the third part, the Public Goods budget):

  • This proposes to create a governance sub-module called “Celo Public Goods Budget” that proposes a draw of 1.XM USD to a new multi-sig managed by a self-selected group of Stewards
  • The contents of the budget are as per @LuukDAO’s original link: DRAFT - Fund the Celo Public Goods Budget H1 2024 - Google Docs but each of these spends will be voted on by CELO holders in Snapshot. Snapshot will be the new focus point for discussion and voting for usage of the Celo Public Goods Budget
  • Budget spends not approved by Snapshot voters will be returned the Celo Community Fund at the end of H1
  • This is essentially a timeboxed trial of more accountable and consolidated budgeting for usage of the on-chain treasury. Many of the existing governance recipients (Prezenti, Celo Camp, regional DAOs) are being put forth as potential recipients of parts of this budget.

I still want to do a similar exercise for the personnel involved in everything, might get to that this week.

If you find any errors or typos that don’t match the draft budget link, let me know and I’ll update the diagram.


Thanks to all stakeholders for providing valuable input over the past two weeks. The following changes have been made to the documents:

We created the PR with Payload and tested the transaction together with Mento Labs

Governance Updates

  • Clarified the governance phases and improved readability
  • Changed Submission Requirements for Celo Governance Contracts submission from a Minimum of 100,000 Locked Celo Balance to a Deposit of 10,000 Locked Celo.
  • Updated Minimum cooldown period for a proposal with majority yes votes that didn’t reach quorum from 1 to 2 full weeks.
  • Updated Minimum cooldown period for a proposal with a majority of no votes from 1 to 4 full weeks.
  • Added Ruben as a Governance Guardian.

Mento Proposal

  • Updated the calculation on January 22nd, 2024.
  • Added clarification on the Action plan and Mento Reserve Mandate.

Public Goods Stewards

  • Added the Regenerative Finance Foundation, a non-profit foundation as operator of the Public Goods Stewards budget.
  • Expanded stewards to 5 active and 4 passive members
  • Expanded the multisig from 4 out of 7 to 5 out of 9
  • Added the following active stewards: Sophia Dew, Daniel Olarte
  • Removed the following active steward: Marco Barbossa
  • Added the following passive stewards: Aaron Boyd, Maya Brown, Marco Barbossa and Pedro Oliveira

Next Steps
The proposal has been formatted as CGP in Github and submitted for CGP editor review. Tomorrow, January 24th, 2024, we hope to present during the Governance call. If no significant conflicts arise, we aim to submit the proposal to Celo Governance the day after, on January 25th.


Thank you @LuukDAO and everyone involved for all your significant and extensive work! The dedication, thoughtfulness, and hard work that have gone into developing these documents are commendable and reflect the strong commitment we all share towards the growth and betterment of the Celo ecosystem and humanity :slightly_smiling_face:

I would like to apologize for the length of this reply. Given the significance and potential impact of this unified proposal on the future of Celo, I believe it is essential to provide a detailed response.

Unified Proposal Approach

Regrettably, as evident from the draft documents, there is minimal commentary from Celo stakeholders. As observable on this page, consolidating the discussion into a single thread does not seem to encourage detailed community discourse. Each of these proposals could significantly influence the future of the Celo ecosystem, and I believe we should separate the discussions into individual threads. Additionally, I think we should also have separate votes for them, as these proposals can stand independently. I would encourage having more discussion on the topics before submitting them to the voting phase.

Fun fact: Since the 1980s, Israel has struggled with the “Arrangements Law,” which has challenged its democratic process. Remarkably, 60% of budget votes are consolidated into this single law, significantly affecting legislative transparency and accountability.

Areas for Enhancement and Further Discussion

A debate on centralized vs. decentralized approaches to growing the ecosystem, and the views of the Celo Foundation and Regional DAOs on this matter

  • In the past year, the Celo Foundation significantly reduced its ecosystem growth activities, downsizing the development team and pausing grants, while some regional business development was led by the Regional DAOs. What insights can the Celo Foundation offer about its past years’ ecosystem growth activities? How does it envision its role in ecosystem growth moving forward in light of this proposal? My experience at the Celo Foundation showed how its brand acts like an embassy, swiftly opening doors and creating meaningful opportunities for the community. I believe we should continue leveraging Celo Foundation’s brand to develop and facilitate ecosystem growth, including its website and online channels.

  • Although enhanced coordination, consolidated goals, and accountability for the Regional DAOs’ work are necessary, it’s vital to empower these DAOs while preserving their autonomy. Their perspectives on this proposal are missing.

  • Celo Camp has been instrumental in supporting leading projects in the Celo ecosystem, but it also rejected around 500 projects annually that might find it hard to succeed in the Celo ecosystem without participating in the program. While I worked in Celo Camp in the past, I believe we should discuss and consider how do we welcome and support more projects in the Celo ecosystem, and make sure we are not limiting the growth of the ecosystem by centralized approaches.

  • The Celo Foundation and Regional DAOs have extensive experience in developing Celo’s ecosystem, and I recommend including their representatives in the list of stewards.

A clearer role description for Governance Stewards, avoiding centralization

The proposals are inconsistent regarding the Stewards’ roles, assigning them both strategic consulting and hands-on program management responsibilities (QF & RPGF). I suggest separating these roles. The Stewards’ work in leading specific ecosystem initiatives, similar to other ecosystem initiative leaders (Prezenti, Celo Camp, etc.), is unrelated to their role as Stewards. Having a group of experts to support the Celo ecosystem’s growth is beneficial, but it’s crucial to ensure that decision-making authority remains with the Celo community. This balance is essential to maintain the ecosystem’s decentralized nature.

In my perspective, the governance structure can be envisioned as comprising three distinct yet interlinked layers:

  1. Strategic Advisory Layer: At this level, we have the Governance Stewards. Their role is primarily to provide strategic guidance, offering insights and recommendations to steer the Celo ecosystem towards long-term goals. Importantly, they do this without having direct control over fund allocations, ensuring a balance between advisory input and on-ground decision-making. The Stewards are also tasked with executing decisions made by the community through the Snapshot process. However, their role in this regard is purely operational.

  2. Coordination and Facilitation Layer: This is where the Celo Foundation Ecosystem Development Circle comes into play. Their function is pivotal in nurturing the ecosystem, as they assist in developing proposals, coordinating project activities, facilitating communication, and creating growth opportunities. Their work ensures that ideas and plans are well-articulated and aligned with Celo’s overarching vision.

  3. Operational Execution Layer: This layer focuses on the practical, hands-on implementation and execution of the ecosystem initiatives that have received community approval. Stewards might act as the project managers of the Celo Public Goods Quadratic Funding Round, the Climate Quadratic Funding Round and the Retrospective Celo Public Goods Funding but are doing so independently from their role as Stewards and are expected to go through the Snapshot voting, in a similar fashion to other well regards stakeholders like Celp Camp, Prezenti and the Regional DAOs.

Concern about the name

The current title, “Celo Public Goods Budget” may be somewhat misleading, as the scope of activities extends beyond what’s traditionally defined as ‘public goods’. Public goods are resources that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning their use by one individual does not reduce availability to others, and they are available to all without exclusion. Examples include clean air, public parks, or in the context of blockchain, open-source software and decentralized protocols.

However, the activities and initiatives proposed under this budget seem to encompass a broader range of community and ecosystem development projects, which may not strictly qualify as public goods. These projects, while immensely valuable, might include elements of exclusivity or rivalry in terms of resource allocation, target beneficiaries, or specific regional focus.

Therefore, a more encompassing title like “Celo Ecosystem Development Budget” might better capture the wide range of intended initiatives. This title change would align the name with the broader objectives of fostering growth, innovation, and inclusivity within the Celo ecosystem.

Improvement in the proposals discussion process

We need to reconsider how we discuss proposals, as the current process does not foster detailed discussion. I believe we need longer calls (the last governance call allowed only 5-10 minutes for each proposal) and expert panels to provide professional opinions on proposals on behalf of the community.

Instead of creating a threshold that many global proposals cannot meet (might it be 10k or 100k Celo), we could allow anyone to post a forum proposal while setting a threshold for governance calls. This approach supports a permissionless environment while focusing our attention on more meritorious proposals.

Whales unveiling

I believe a proposal encouraging Celo whales to reveal themselves and participate in voting is missing. The Celo ecosystem boasts identified leaders who do not hide behind anonymous labels. However, community decision-makers are still directed by anonymous wallet addresses. It would be beneficial if we could use Snapshot to enhance transparency in this regard.

I recently sought funding for the Mentors Collective and lobbied the community, but a list of Celo whales, which some stakeholders possess, was unavailable, and ultimately, the proposal did not meet the quorum. Improving this through Snapshot would be remarkable.

Specific comments on the drafts

Celo Governance Guidelines draft

  • Celo Public Goods Snapshot - I think that lowering the quorum from 6 million CELO to 2.5m CELO isn’t enough. Mentors Collective for instance received a lot of community attention (&72 votes) but reached only 2m CELO votes in total.

  • Discussion duration - 7 days isn’t enough for discussion. For instance, as you can see, this topic is very much dear to me and I didn’t have the time to work on it last week. I would suggest 14 or 21 days.

Mento Reserve Proposal draft

  • Action Plan section: “The remaining 81.633.780 CELO will be sent to the Celo Community Treasury by the Mento Reserve” while the Description section say “The intent of the CGP is to: Transfer ±41mil Celo from the Mento Reserve to the Celo Governance contract (Community Fund)”. Is this a mistake?

Celo Public Goods budget draft

  • I would recommend depositing the main ecosystem budget of Celo in the hands of the Celo Foundation and avoid using new organization structures (“Regenerative Finance Foundation”).

  • “Motivation” section:

    • “Other impacts have included: reduced access to capital for new and existing community ventures on Celo - I’d like to question that unfortunately. There are less funds for grants, less funds for the regional DAOs to operate, no funds for marketing initiatives (hackathons, conferences sponsorships, Celo Connect), and no funds for initiative like Mentors Collective that aims to supports founders (since Celo Camp aims to ask for the full budget allocated for incubating projects).
  • “Specifications Outcomes and Deliverables” section

    • “Develop Celo Public Goods Web Platform” - I suggest this website will be a part of Celo.org and we save this budget.

    • “Celo Public Goods Communication” - I suggest we direct most of the communication to the official channels of Celo - Twitter, Mirror, newsletters and website.

    • “Manage Celo Public Goods Multi-sig” - in order to simplify things so it will be easier to track the funds. I would suggest having two seperate multisigs wallets:

      1. Operations budget multisig - for paying Stewards for their work.

      2. Projects funding multisig - for sending funds to the Snapshot accepted proposals.

  • “Celo Public Goods Operations Budget” section

    • Public Goods Operations by Stewards (70,000 cUSD + 100,000 CELO) & Governance Guardians (30,000 cUSD) - I believe we shuld follow previous proposals and break this down to how many hours and what is the hourly rate of Stewards and Guardians.

A Call for Enhanced Engagement and Balance

In conclusion, while I appreciate the efforts and intentions behind these proposals, it’s evident that further refinement and community engagement are necessary to ensure they align with Celo’s ethos of decentralization and inclusivity. The proposed changes carry significant weight for the future of the Celo ecosystem, and thus, it’s paramount that we proceed with a balanced approach that fosters innovation, maintains transparency, and respects the diverse voices within our community.

I strongly advocate for a more participatory discussion process, clearer role definitions to avoid centralization, and a reevaluation of the naming and structure of the proposals to more accurately reflect their scope and impact. Ultimately, our goal should be to create a governance framework and funding strategy that not only addresses current challenges but also lays a solid foundation for the sustainable and equitable growth of the Celo ecosystem.

In the spirit of contributing to this collective endeavor, I am willing to actively participate in shaping these frameworks and offer my service as a steward. I believe that together, we can work towards refining these proposals to pave the way for a more prosperous and inclusive future for all stakeholders in the Celo community.


I completely agree with you. Couldn’t have said it better. Thank you for being detailed about your opinion regardless the length. @eladmin


@eladmin i think you’d make a great steward. Very thoughtful points raised.


I’m not comfortable with this addition at the eleventh hour. In what capacity is this entity the operator? Who are the principals and staff of the Regenerative Finance Foundation? How do their roles differ or cross-over with the Stewards?

We really need clarification of the personnel, accountability and the lines of reporting and compensation (as @eladmin mentioned).

My understanding was that the Stewards, would be the sole managers and operators of this proposed budget, on-chain, via their multi-sig. Individuals have come forward to nominate themselves in this thread for this purpose.

I propose we discuss this in detail at the governance forum this afternoon.

Edit 1: grammar

Hi @eladmin Elad, thanks for leaving your comments. I’ve written up answers for each of your Qs, and I look forward to further elaborating in the Governance Call later today.

Unified Proposal: Initially, we intended to submit three separate proposals in parallel; however, due to the interconnected relationship of the documents, this would add additional complexity. Due to the upcoming CEL2 transition and the fact nearly all Celo Community Treasury funded programs are paused waiting for this proposal to be voted on, we made the decision to package it as one proposal.

Celo Foundation positioning in the ecosystem: I’m not part of the Celo Foundation and can’t speak for them, but based on the cLabs proposal and Strategic Grant for MiniPay, it’s clear that additional resources and support are required from the Celo Community Treasury to accelerate development. While we aim to collaborate closely with the Celo Foundation and leverage its channels, taking over critical assets such as the Website is outside the scope for this initial half year.

Regional DAO input: All current regional DAOs (Africa, Korea, Latam, Europe) have provided input in the proposal creation process.

Celo Camp: Agreed, the Public Goods Steward initiative aims to increase coordination and CRM sharing between Celo Community Treasury-funded initiatives.

Clear role description for Governance Stewards: In the current process, the Stewards serve merely as facilitators. The Stewards don’t set the budgets and do not allocate the budgets to specific entities. All decision-making remains in the hands of Celo voters. The QF and RPGF processes are methods through which resources can be allocated to Celo Public Goods, and also, here, the Stewards will not be the main decision-makers in who receives funding.

While your three-layer approach can work, it would take significant time and resources to set this system up and operate it. A feature iteration of the Governance Guidelines could follow such logic, but more time has to be spent on this.

The Name: The term “Public Goods” is used more loosely in the Web3 space than its traditional counterpart. In this context, the term is used to describe any project or initiative that contributes to the well-being of a community/ecosystem. As such, any initiative that generates long-term value to Celo can be considered a Celo Public Good. From the perspective of building a digital regenerative economy, as Celo articulates in its vision, the Celo Public Goods can be seen as the capital assets we aim to nurture to improve the well-being of Celo.

From this perspective, it makes sense for the Celo Community Treasury to primarily fund Celo Public Goods; thus the naming is justified.

While Ecosystem could be used as a name, I want to make you aware that there is an existing Celo Ecosystem team operational in the Celo Foundation, and this name would create friction.

Improving the discussion process: Agreed that the current governance discussion process, especially the governance calls, can improve. We imagine the Governance Guardians will develop this as part of this proposal. To date, the CGP editors have made all their efforts voluntarily, limiting the time they could commit to it.

In the proposed setup, anybody can submit a proposal to the Celo Forum for discussion without any requirements. To submit the actual proposal for a vote, there are some requirements to reduce spam and proposals that do not follow the guidelines. However, in the proposed structure, any proposal that follows the guidelines can be submitted for a vote by a Guardian or any other stakeholder that matches the required criteria.

Whales unveiling: Agreed that moving to a solution that encourages adding an identity to a voting address would improve governance coordination, hence why we included Snapshot in our setup.

Snapshot quorum: We believe 2.5M, equal to only 0.25% of all CELO tokens, to be the minimum participation needed to ratify a vote. One could argue that the Mentors Collective proposal wasn’t considered important enough by stakeholders, as the subsequent proposal received 20M+ votes and the previous proposal received 11M+ votes.

Discussion duration: The 7 days is the bare minimum required for a proposal to be considered able to progress towards a vote. While the current proposal is one of the most significant proposals to date and indeed requires more time, we don’t want to set a minimum that is too long and will slow down governance. There are various proposals that require less discussion, such as adding a new Oracle party or making minor adjustments to the chain.

Action Plan: The latest numbers are clarified in the CGP and JSON. The 41M is from an old draft that only specified the transactions in the Payload. The exact amount is 81,633,000.

On the role of the Regenerative Finance Foundation: As became apparent in the past week, a legal entity is required for Steward operations and hosting some resources. The Regenerative Finance Foundation is an existing non-profit foundation established in 2021 to receive a Celo Grant and is located in Willemstad, Curacao. The Regenerative Finance Foundation has three board members, namely Luuk Weber (Chair), Renç Korzay, COO of Giza (treasurer), and Priscilla Lotman, founder of AVA2 and legal council (secretary). The Regenerative Finance Foundation will play a passive role and only facilitate the administration and distribution of the Celo Public Goods Stewards operations budget following the decision made by the group itself.

Coordinating this effort through the Celo Foundation would be challenging as it would likely create legal and operational friction.

Limited funding for new community ventures: This proposal does indeed cap the resources available for new community ventures. As became clear from the accounting dashboard, before this proposal, the Community Treasury would have a remaining runway of 18-24 months. The overall consensus among stakeholders was that we must grasp the Treasury spending and strategy. This proposal aims to start with a capped budget to set a benchmark, after which Celo Governance can decide to expand its budget in the future. However, there are multiple means for initiatives to receive funding, such as the Grants budget, Quadratic Funding, and Retrospective funding.

Benefit of separate communication: Celo Org is developed and managed by the Celo Foundation, and as such can’t be simply taken over by third parties without significant consideration. As it’s connected to the Celo Foundation, some elements can not be published because of legal or reputational concerns. The same goes for the Celo socials. By establishing communications in parallel yet working closely with the Foundation, we will increase the ability to communicate with existing and new Celo stakeholders.

Separation of Multi-sigs: Happy to separate the activities into two Multi-sigs. We’ve generated the 5 out of 9 multi-sigs with the addresses of the Stewards mentioned in this proposal here (Celo Public Goods H1 2024) and here (Celo Public Goods Stewards Operations). Will coordinate with Steward for them to verify their specific addresses publicly in the coming days.

Detailed Budget Breakdown: The Stewards and Guardians will align the specific breakdown of commitments and rewards internally. We’re actively scoping the detailed line items, and will provide full financial transparency throughout the following months. To give an indication, the current estimated hourly reward for Stewards is 50 cUSD + 100 CELO per hour, with a limit of 10 hours a month for passive stewards and 25 hours a month for an active steward. In addition, approximately 10,000 cUSD is set aside for accounting and legal fees.


Below is an overview of frequently asked questions with answers.

What are Celo Public Goods? Why fund them?
The term "Public Goods’’ is used more loosely in the Web3 space than its traditional counterpart. In this context, the term is used to describe any project or initiative that contributes to the well-being of a community /ecosystem. As such, any initiative that generates long-term value for Celo can be considered a Celo Public Good. From the perspective of building a digital regenerative economy, as Celo articulates in its vision, the Celo Public Goods can be seen as the capital assets we aim to nurture to improve Celo’s well-being. Examples of Celo Public Goods are educational resources, developer tools, governance frameworks, and incubation programs.

Why submit it as one significant proposal instead of separate proposals
Initially, we intended to submit three separate proposals in parallel; however, due to the interconnected relationship of the documents, this would add additional complexity. Due to the upcoming CEL2 transition and nearly all Celo Community Treasury-funded programs being paused while waiting for this proposal to be voted on, we decided to package it as one proposal.

Will Celo Voters or the Public Goods Stewards select which groups receive funding?
The proposal suggests keeping the decision-making power to decide which specific groups receive funding in the hands of Celo voters. Projects that want to receive Celo Public Goods funding can submit their particular proposal in line with the Public Goods Budget guidelines to the Celo Public Goods Snapshot space, where Celo Voters will decide if their proposal is approved or not. The Public Goods Stewards merely facilitate the manual transfer and accounting of resources.

Who will apply for Celo Public Goods funding?
Any Celo-aligned service provider who believes they possess the skill set and context to provide value in line with the Public Goods Budget can apply for Public Goods Funding by submitting a proposal. Existing service providers with a proven track record, such as Celo Camp and Prezenti, will receive priority in the initial Public Goods budget for H1 2024.

What function does the Regenerative Finance Foundation play in this proposal?
As became apparent in the past week, a legal entity is required for Steward operations and hosting some resources. The Regenerative Finance Foundation is an existing non-profit foundation established in 2021 to receive a Celo Grant and is located in Willemstad, Curacao. The Regenerative Finance Foundation has three board members, namely Luuk Weber (Chair), Renç Korzay, COO of Giza (treasurer), and Priscilla Lotman, founder of AVA2 and legal council (secretary). The Regenerative Finance Foundation will play a passive role and only support the administration of the Operations budget, while control of resources remains with the Steward’s multisig.

What is the difference between the current CGP editor role and the new Governance Guardian Role?
The CGP editors were voluntary contributors who primarily supported the validation of Celo Governance Proposals submitted to GitHub via the Governance Process. The new Governance Guardian role will reward contributors for supporting the entire governance process, from helping new proposers align with the right category and helping them understand the governance process to hosting Governance calls and reviewing if proposals follow the governance guidelines.

How will the Celo Public Goods budget be managed?
The Celo Public Goods budget will be allocated through the votes in the Celo Public Gods Snapshot space and managed through two 5 out of 9 multi-sigs with the addresses of the Stewards mentioned in this proposal. The multi-sigs can be seen here (Celo Public Goods H1 2024) and here (Celo Public Goods Stewards Operations).

Will the transfer of CELO and minting cUSD put the Mento Reserve at risk?
Returning the CELO and minting an additional 10,000,000 cUSD will decrease the overall Mento Reserve Ratio to approximately 1.9. This means each cStable would still be backed by nearly double the value. As long as the share of Stablecoin collateral equals or is larger than the outstanding amount of cStables, the new Reserve Ratio should not lead to significant additional risks for cStable users.

Where can we see the on-chain elements of this proposal?
The PR with Payload for this proposal has been written and tested in collaboration with Mento Labs. Please find the JSON with descriptions and a test here.


Hi @eladmin ,

I go by Airu but you can call me Ruben. Thank you for this extensive piece of ideas and concerns concerning this proposal draft. They are very just to have and offer the writer and participants of this proposal to have a deeper reflection on what we are missing and what could be improved. I do have a few questions that came up from the reply:

  • What are considered Celo Stakeholders within this piece? Are they anybody that has an account on this forum or is it more far-reaching than this?
  • Are there any Celo Foundation members reviewing this proposal draft? Or have there been any current Celo foundation members reviewing this proposal?

Also, i believe reading your thoughts and concerns. Your role as a steward is much needed within the future of Celo Governance and “Public Goods” ( or Celo Ecosystem Development Budget, as I believe this name is also less misleading than the current web3 definition of Public Goods as it leads to less confusion) initiative.

,Bless Airu.


Chiming in here to share some additional thoughts, also on some of the additional comments raised in the last couple of days. Sorry for missing yesterday’s governance call. I heard from a few folks that it was a very productive discussion and @ericnakagawa was also able to address some of the points from a Celo Foundation perspective already. With my ‘Celo Foundation’ hat on, @Airu I can confirm that our team at Celo Foundation has been providing input and feedback on the proposals and process overall but also it is important to us for this to be and remain a community-led effort.

Celo Foundation’s role is to support the ecosystem and provide a bunch of ecosystem services & public goods, with the broadest possible mandate - I like the ‘embassy’ analogy @eladmin uses in his comment - but with a strong appetite to empower others vs accumulating influence, not to dissimilar to the Ethereum Foundation’s philosophy especially around subtraction (EF Philosophy | The Ethereum Foundation).

I think @LuukDAO has led this in a formidable way involving key stakeholders from the ecosystem and being open to also including voices from the periphery, including many smaller, newer grassroots initiatives. I also applaud the open communications and quick turn-around on the discussion points and if the process so far is any indication of how this will actually run, I am very hopeful. With any new big initiative, I am sure there’s going to be room for improvement for future cycles and from interacting with @LuukDAO and some of the other Stewards I get the understanding this is being approached in a very agile way.

Excited to see this initiative move forward for H1 and support it from Celo Foundation side.