Appreciate the thoughtful discussion here @alex_Verda . I’ll add a few points:
1. Our validator group never sells CELO to exit rewards
We only ever swap cUSD directly for USDC. It’s worth clarifying that there are multiple liquidity routes available, and the assumption that validator rewards always convert into CELO and then hit CEX order books simply doesn’t hold in practice.
2. The real issue is circulating supply management, not validator pay
Cutting validator count might marginally slow emissions, but it doesn’t structurally solve the token-supply problem.
If the concern is about long-term inflation and supply overhang, then we should address that directly — not through proxy cuts to active infrastructure contributors.
3. “Unsustainable inflation” is a narrative choice, not an inevitability
The claim that emissions could “run out in under ten years” assumes perpetual inflation is required for network health.
Bitcoin is a clear counter-example: its emission schedule ends and becomes deflationary — and that’s part of what gives BTC long-term credibility.
Celo no longer depends on CELO for base-layer security as it did pre-L2. So why keep inflating it indefinitely?
If we’re serious about hardening tokenomics, one radical but principled option would be to front-load issuance — even 10x it temporarily — to finish emissions within a year and then transition to a deflationary phase. That creates a predictable, scarce supply curve.
4. Mento and the L2 fee structure broke the original feedback loop
@Wade nailed this point. Celo’s original cGLD design tied stablecoin demand directly to CELO demand.
Once CELO was no longer the primary asset in the Mento reserve and the transaction-fee burn was replaced with redistribution, that feedback loop disappeared. Today, most fee flows actually increase circulating CELO instead of reducing it.
If the goal is to strengthen CELO’s economics then:
-
Divert the current 10% carbon offset allocation to CELO burns.
-
Require all gas tokens to be settled in CELO, and burn a fixed portion automatically.
-
Require CELO burns or deposits for governance participation (e.g. proposal submissions or voting).
Those mechanisms would restore meaningful sink behavior in CELO’s supply dynamics — the opposite of what’s happening now.