Restore Remaining CELO Spend Allowance to Stabila Multi-sig

Receiver Entity: Celo Governance
Status: DRAFT
Title: Restore Remaining CELO Spend Allowance to Stabila Multi-sig
Author(s): @MichaelKwan
Type of Request: Funding
Funding Request: N/A

Summary

On behalf of Stabila Foundation, this proposal corrects the spending allowance for the Stabila Multi-sig (0x9C257bDC314dc516e673728D70F45444F6e22412) by restoring the remaining 2,136,556.64 CELO from the original 5M CELO allocation approved by the Celo Community Fund in May 2024 via CGP 132.

To date, 2,863,443.36 CELO have been withdrawn under that original authorization. However, the subsequent proposal, CGP 162, which approved an additional 2M CELO + 1M cUSD for Aave liquidity support, unintentionally overwrote the previous CELO allowance instead of layering on top of the unwithdrawn balance.

Reinstating the unwithdrawn 2,136,556.64 CELO brings the allowance back in line with the original governance intent.

Motivation

The 5M CELO approved in CGP 132 funded the launch of the Stabila Foundation and its mission of accelerating stablecoin adoption across Celo. As of February 2025, only 2,863,443.36 CELO had been withdrawn under that authorization.

On February 27, 2025, the community passed CGP 162, which approved an additional 2M CELO + 1M cUSD to support Aave’s deployment on Celo. However, the on-chain implementation of CGP 162 used approve() rather than increaseAllowance(), thereby resetting the CELO allowance for the Stabila Multi-sig to 2M CELO. This unintentionally removed the remaining ~2.14M CELO balance from CGP 132.

Correcting this allowance is essential to ensure alignment with governance intent and to enable Stabila to continue executing its mandate, including the On-Chain FX campaign and the Uniswap DAO co-incentive commitments.

Specification

This proposal restores the remaining 2,136,556.64 CELO from the original 5M CELO allocation approved under CGP 132 (Stabila Inception), which was unintentionally overwritten by CGP 162 (Aave Liquidity & Incentive Support).

Withdrawal history confirms that 2,863,443.36 CELO was withdrawn from the Community Fund before CGP 162 implementation, leaving 2,136,556.64 CELO unwithdrawn from the original authorization. Detailed transaction records can be found in the Filtered Celoscan View.

Currently, CeloScan’s GoldToken Read Proxy Contract shows 605,261.16 CELO remains available for withdrawal by the Stabila multisig. This reflects the 2M CELO approved under CGP 162, minus the 1,394,738.84 CELO already withdrawn after its implementation.

The GitHub implementation of CGP 162 confirms that the following approve() function was called:

{

"contract": "GoldToken",

"address": "0x471EcE3750Da237f93B8E339c536989b8978a438",

"function": "approve",

"args": [

"0x9C257bDC314dc516e673728D70F45444F6e22412",

"2000000000000000000000000"

],

"value": "0"

}

To correct this and restore the 2,136,556.64 CELO from CGP 132, this proposal will execute the following increaseAllowance() call:

{

"contract": "GoldToken",

"address": "0x471EcE3750Da237f93B8E339c536989b8978a438",

"function": "increaseAllowance",

"args": [

"0x9C257bDC314dc516e673728D70F45444F6e22412",

"2136556640000000000000000"

],

"value": "0"

}

This will fully reinstate the original 5M CELO authorization from CGP 132, bringing the Stabila multisig’s allowance back in line with community-approved intent.

Metrics and KPIs

N/A

Current Status

N/A

Timeline and Milestones

  • Execution: Immediate restoration of allowance upon proposal passing

Detailed Budget

N/A

Payment Terms

N/A

Team

Stabila Multi-Sig: 0x9C257bDC314dc516e673728D70F45444F6e22412

The Stabila Foundation will manage fund allocation and oversight. At the time of this proposal, the multisig signers include all known Celo contributors:

  • Kevin Tharayil: 0x605C6B7a97748cbd0DE9C8643cdc502AB1DfDEd2
  • Productmatt: 0x1f5979355411dF24c5Ce21Df5bD9f2fff418c194
  • Martin Volpe: 0x0159B8f51fA6eDEF721d6D87002587130CD8246c
  • Michael Kwan: 0x78670759E39E955E55EFA52d6d4BECa86F40b498

Additional Support/Resources

N/A

Appendix:

Transaction Date CELO Withdrawal from Community Fund
2025-03-17 (Post CGP 162) 1,000,000.00
2025-03-17 (Post CGP 162) 1.00
2025-03-06 (Post CGP 162) 394,736.84
2025-03-06 (Post CGP 162) 1.00
2025-01-15 354,098.36
2024-12-13 11,494.00
2024-12-02 266,667.00
2024-11-03 350,820.00
2024-10-25 53,571.00
2024-10-18 133,333.00
2024-09-25 212,532.00
2024-09-06 416,667.00
2024-08-23 328,260.00
2024-08-19 101,000.00
2024-08-09 555,000.00
2024-07-09 80,000.00
2024-07-03 1.00
Total Withdrawal Pre-CGP 162 2,863,443.36 (2,136,556.64 Remaining from original 5M CELO)
Total Withdrawn Post CGP 162 (Aave) 1,394,738.84
4 Likes

unintentionally overwrote the previous CELO allowance instead of layering on top of the unwithdrawn balance.

Sounds like an accidental activation of checks and balances.

I’ve been hesitant about establishing Stabila from the beginning (as noted in my comment on the initial forum post), and after reviewing the latest progress report (Stabila Foundation: Progress Report) as well as the “Proven Track Record” (Stabila Funding Request: Aave Liquidity & Incentives) post in the Aave liquidity thread, I decided to dig a bit deeper into the stated achievements.

Findings:

  1. The Celo Uniswap v3 vaults are no longer live on Merkl (Explore opportunities). In fact, they’re listed as “past opportunities.” This is concerning given the $426,431 reportedly spent on Merkl campaigns. It’s unclear why these efforts were discontinued.
  2. The most utilized vault on SteerProtocol (USDT/cUSD) currently has a TVL of just $23. The remaining vaults on Celo under Steer have even less activity.
  3. The cUSD/USDT vault on ICHI does show some traction with around $95K in TVL, this appears to be one of the few bright spots.
  4. Tether x Valora Campaign: The campaign was geo-locked to Vietnam, South Africa, and Brazil. If this campaign was funded through Stabila, it raises the question: why was it geo-locked? This limits its effectiveness in broader Celo adoption.
  5. Trust Wallet Campaign: This appears to be one of the better initiatives. However, I noticed that the rewards were distributed via Merkl. Not sure why.

Also, it remains difficult to isolate and attribute success solely to Stabila initiatives. Several other well established protocols like Mento have run parallel or overlapping stablecoin adoption campaigns, making attribution challenging without clear, independently verifiable metrics. In the few cases where data is transparent and traceable, the adoption metrics and outcomes do not appear to support the scale of investment or the narrative presented in the reports and claims.

This isn’t intended as an attack, but rather a call for accountability, transparency, and better metrics. I would welcome a response that helps clarify or even correct my analysis. As someone who supports the growth of Celo, especially in South Africa, I had hoped for more impressive outcomes from this initiative.

Thanks @MichaelKwan and team for the proposal, at my end this proposal is fulfilling all the requirements:

  • Post a proposal in the Celo Forum and leave it for discussion at least for seven (7) days.
  • Present Proposal in a Governance Call and address the feedback received: Proposal was presented during Celo Governance Call #66 | April 17th, 2025

With the above said, from my end the proposal is ready to move into the voting phase when proposer wants to move forward or consider is appropriate.


:bangbang: Remember Current Celo Governance Overview & Procedures

To proceed to the submission and voting phase at least two Celo Governance Guardians must post explicitly that the proposal fulfills the requirements to be able to move into the Voting Stage in the proposal thread on the Celo Forum.


Remember next steps

  • Submission of PR to Celo Governance Repository
    Proposers needs to fork the Celo Governance Repository and add a PR including the proposal .md file and json file.
  • Approval of PR by Celo governance Guardians and merge into main branch of Celo Governance Repository.
    Celo Guardians are responsible for conducting a comprehensive review of every Pull Request (PR) to ensure that there is complete alignment and consistency between the final proposal posted in the forum post and the specific files that are being requested to be merged.
    This review process is strictly technical in nature, focusing solely on verifying the authenticity and good faith of the proposers. It does not involve any personal opinions or biases regarding the merits or content of the proposal itself. To maintain the integrity of the Celo Governance repository, it is mandatory to obtain approval from a minimum of two Governance Guardians for each PR before it can be merged into the main branch.
  • OnChain Submission of Proposal
    After PR is merged into main Governance Repo the proposers needs to fork locally the Celo Governance Repository and submit the proposal onchain using the guidelines described in the Celo Docs.

CC: Governance Working Group (@annaalexa @Wade @0xGoldo)

I also confirm this fulfills the requirements and is ready to submit onchain. Appreciate the time today!

Thank you for your detailed feedback. We value accountability and transparency, so I appreciate the opportunity to provide clarification:

  1. On Merkl campaigns: You’re right that the Uniswap incentives are currently listed as “past opportunities” on Merkl. These were strategically paused recently while preparing for a much larger campaign in the coming weeks. Stabila has secured a significant collaboration with Uniswap DAO for a 6-month campaign worth $750K USD total ($500K in CELO from Stabila and $250K in UNI tokens from Uniswap DAO)
  • The team just finalized technical details such as UNI token support on SuperBridge to ensure all incentives are streamed on Celo, and is re-evaluating incentive allocations across pools.
  1. Past Merkl campaigns attracted over 300+ unique liquidity providers. Many users prefer to add liquidity directly on Uniswap to manage their concentrated positions rather than using automated liquidity managers.
  2. On the Tether x Valora Campaign: This was a high-leverage initiative where Stabila contributed $70K, with matching funds from both Tether and Valora. The geo-targeting was a strategic decision made in collaboration with Valora to focus on markets they were expanding into and where USDT adoption would have the most impact.
  3. Regarding Trust Wallet: Funds were transferred directly to the Trust Wallet team, who chose Merkl as their distribution platform. It seems Merkl is used quite frequently in the industry. For example, Aave Chan Initiative (ACI) also uses Merkl in the backend to distribute rewards to Aave users.

Stabila is continuously refining its measurement and reporting methods. The next progress report will provide more comprehensive details to demonstrate the impact of these initiatives better.

1 Like

Why are people voting “No” on this when it is a purely technical proposal to fix a mistake made in a previous allowance adjustment?

The time for comments was in the original proposals, supporting “No” here is a vote for removing allowances half way through project implementation simply because there is an opportunity to, and your mind has been changed. This may be a valid position but it feels in bad faith.

I had my own concerns about Stabila and other large multi-million dollar proposals and the transparency around them, but I’m fine with fixing an implementation error.

2 Likes

Totally, I cannot see any reason to vote “NO” in this proposal.

1 Like

Easy to understand summary from ChatGPT if people don’t understand the summary:

What Happened

  • In May 2024, the Celo community approved a plan (called CGP 132) to give the Stabila Foundation 5 million CELO to help grow stablecoins on the Celo network.
  • So far, Stabila has used about 2.86 million CELO from that amount.

:cross_mark: The Problem

  • In February 2025, a new plan (CGP 162) was approved to give Stabila another 2 million CELO + 1 million cUSD to support a project with Aave.
  • But when that new funding was set up on-chain, it accidentally erased the leftover 2.14 million CELO from the earlier 5M grant.
  • This happened because the new approval replaced the old one, instead of adding on top of it.

:white_check_mark: What This Proposal Fixes

  • The new proposal says: Let’s fix that mistake and give back the missing 2.14 million CELO from the original 5M approval.
  • That way, Stabila can keep doing the work the community agreed to, like supporting FX trading on-chain and partnering with Uniswap DAO.

:magnifying_glass_tilted_right: Current Status

  • Right now, the Stabila wallet can only access about 605,000 CELO (what’s left from the 2M approved in February).
  • This fix would bring their total allowance back in line with the original intent of the community.
2 Likes

Why are people voting “No”

Isn’t that the very essence of a democratic process of governance? We cannot label a disagreement as “bad faith”. Framing dissent in this way (dare I say voter shaming) risks shutting down legitimate debate and creates pressure to conform which can be damaging and unhealthy for this ecosystem.

The time for comments was in the original proposals

Is the community not supposed to act afterwards? In a proper decentralized community, governance is ongoing. The community should always retain the ability to reconsider funding whenever new context emerges. While this is a technical correction of an originally approved funding, there is no automatic entitlement (or de jure recognition) to receive their remaining funding and this is precisely why this governance proposal exists in the first place. What one person sees as a “fixing an implementation error” another may reasonably view this as “fixing the ecosystem”. Both interpretations are valid and deserve space in the conversation.

simply because there is an opportunity to, and your mind has been changed…This may be a valid position

This implies opportunism, when in reality, people may vote “No” in good faith based on newely available information, concerns about transparency, or broader ecosystem priorities. Changing your mind (especially when new information comes to light) is not bad faith; it’s responsible governance.

Even if shared as a personal opinion, the Governance Guardian tag carries authority and can influence perception. It’s important that those in such roles remain nonpartisan and impartial when openly voicing views to avoid signaling bias so as to uphold community trust (You are free to vote however you want and express the thought process in your delegate thread). You are essentially like the FEC.

2 Likes

I understand and agree with some of what you said. However, being able to change our minds based on performance to date, and effectively cancel previously agreed / voted on allowances is not a current part of the governance system.

I would argue that there should be perhaps some mechanism like this, that very large governance proposals (in dollar terms) should be structured in 6-monthly tranches, such that continuance of the tranches is dependent on the public acceptance and visibility that everything they set out to do is on track.

I think that people voting “No” on this, while of course it’s their right, are essentially creating this structure of progressively voting for performance-based continuance, before it’s been more formalized and communicated, simply because of a technical error gives us this opportunity. I don’t think it’s fair to Stabila who quite reasonably may have incurred costs, made hires, business deals and plans off the basis of their first and second approvals. Additionally this retroactive reduction of approval approach is not applied consistently - in that other large approvals who have already pulled their full amount into their multi-sig, and/or suffered no technical mistakes, are completely free from the possibility of this occurring.

I’m all for more transparency and reporting, you can see in my forum comments I was extremely concerned at the precedent that the CICLOPs proposal set. I’m actually all for smaller or more time-bound proposals so the community can do exactly what appears to be happening here: reviewing the output and re-evaluating whether it’s a good spend for the network.

No shaming either way, disagreement is a good sign that we’re a little bit healthier in governance terms that what used to be the status quo.

3 Likes

I would argue that there should be perhaps some mechanism like this, that very large governance proposals (in dollar terms) should be structured in 6-monthly tranches, such that continuance of the tranches is dependent on the public acceptance and visibility that everything they set out to do is on track.

I strongly agree with this. In fact, I was discussing with someone else earlier today on this forum that short-runway, retroactive funding could be a practical solution to many of the governance issues we’re facing.

being able to change our minds based on performance to date, and effectively cancel previously agreed / voted on allowances is not a current part of the governance system.

I don’t believe Celo governance is (or should be) rigid that this isn’t possible. The broader crypto ecosystem has set precedents where funding has been paused, adjusted, or revoked due to underperformance or lack of transparency. There’s no reason Celo can’t evolve to adopt similar accountability mechanisms.

I don’t think it’s fair to Stabila who quite reasonably may have incurred costs, made hires, business deals and plans off the basis of their first and second approvals.

In the worst case scenario a failed proposal typically returns to the discussion stage, giving the proposer a second chance to revise and clarify their plans. In this case it has already passed so it doesn’t matter.

I’m all for more transparency and reporting, you can see in my forum comments I was extremely concerned

Yes, and I genuinely appreciate that. You’re one of the few voices consistently pushing for higher transparency, and that’s incredibly important for the ecosystem.

In other ecosystems like Optimism and ENS, the bar for transparency is much higher. There are clear financial reports linking to multisig transactions, auditable KPI reports and even dedicated forum tags for highlighting fund misuse or calling for on-the-spot accountability. We need to adapt operational norms as they help produce consistently strong performance.

I’ll reach out to you in private to further continue this conversation.

3 Likes