This is reactionary cost-cutting disguised as optimization. It is built on subjective analysis, misleading framing, and a fundamental misunderstanding of both validator economics and the broader ecosystem’s fiscal challenges. A lot of my points from here are applicable to the proposal as well, so I won’t reiterate them over and over again.
Let’s establish some context. When the Seasonal Intents were released and ecosystem grants were distributed in the first week of August, CELO was trading at approximately $0.30 (roughly the same price it held two weeks ago). The Community Fund runway was entirely predictable at that point. Everyone involved in governance knew exactly what effect those distributions would have on treasury sustainability.
Back then, there were no emergency measures. No proposals to address “excessive spending.” No concern about “runway risk.” The treasury’s trajectory was already baked into the decision-making process.
Now, conveniently, as CELO’s price trends downward, validators have suddenly become the scapegoat for the ecosystem’s spending concerns. This is not principled fiscal policy; it’s opportunistic blame-shifting. If the argument truly hinges on opportunity cost and runway, then the rational step is obvious:
wait for Season 1 performance reports. Let the community assess all ecosystem programs based on actual deliverables and measurable performance, then adjust funding proportionally.
Why are validators being singled out before there’s any transparency on other ecosystem programs have performed?
Your “analysis” is fundamentally subjective and demonstrably inaccurate. The simulation results you reference show that your “likely” validator count projections are off from what would actually occur under the proposed election mechanics (also posted above). This is not rigorous modeling, it is working backward from a desired cost savings number and figuring out in reverse how many validators need to be eliminated to achieve it. The target of 45 validators is entirely arbitrary. There is no technical justification for why 45 is optimal. There is no game-theory modeling of how this concentration affects governance or collusion risk. It is simply: “I think we should save money, and this number saves money.” This is not how you design critical infrastructure policy.
This is wishful thinking at best, and dangerously naive at worst. Validator elections are decentralized and permissionless. Human scoring systems, however well-intentioned, will have zero binding effect on election outcomes. The mechanics of the election are determined by vote weight, not subjective assessments of “alignment” or “activity”. Let’s be brutally honest about what this proposal actually achieves:
- Small validators get eliminated. Groups like @celocolombiano, who have worked for years to secure a single elected slot, get wiped out overnight. Their grassroots progress becomes meaningless.
- Well-capitalized groups consolidate further. Entities like (insert any new group in the last year with > 4 validators), which already have setup capital and five elected validators in months, become entrenched.
- Barriers to entry skyrocket. The validator set becomes a gated club rather than a permissionless network.
Celo isn’t a “charity chain,” true, but it was built on openness and inclusion. Eliminating smaller, independent operators without hard data or transparent justification isn’t optimization; it’s institutional capture disguised as efficiency.
And then there’s this gem:
That line would be darkly comedic if it weren’t so consequential. The implicit message is clear:
“The beatings Validator cuts will continue until morale improves”.