I agree with the big picture here; it’s long overdue that Celo governance be rethought, ideally from the ground up. I’ve made a related post myself, focusing more on revisiting core governance parameters.
You raise several important points:
- Touching the CCF is a slippery slope, even if technically safe, it signals poor optics externally. The idea of using locked CCF CELO to vote on proposals that release unlocked CELO from the same fund already feels self-serving.
- Borrowing from the CCF under promises of future return should generally be discouraged. While precedent exists (e.g. the Stabila-Aave liquidity proposal), the outcome remains questionable (Aave remains underutilized and capped in my specific example). There’s simply no guarantee that such initiatives generate meaningful value, and as you rightly pointed out, the risks are asymmetric.
Now, regarding your proposal: I think it’s a sound idea in theory. Delegation driven by the community rather than centrally distributed voting power is the right direction. But execution is where it will struggle.
There’s little to no incentive for major stakeholders to give up their control, especially when some are directly or indirectly involved in proposals. Realistically, few will voluntarily part with influence.
Programs like these also have a tendency to fizzle out. A good example is the Celo Foundation’s delegation to (single region) college groups. While well-intentioned, it’s hard to call that objectively successful in my opinion. From inactivity to rushed and poorly informed voting, it’s been underwhelming. Anyways, that’s a separate rant, but relevant nonetheless. Even if we hit the target of X million delegated CELO, we risk winding up with disengaged or performative participation after a few months.
Unless there’s some real, upfront commitment from potential delegators, the initiative risks becoming a well-meaning exercise with limited impact. That said, your proposal is a good starting point. But to make it work, we need a much broader overhaul of governance from modifying core parameters to delegation mechanisms like the one you’ve outlined.