This is either deliberately misleading or a profound misunderstanding of power in decentralized systems. Control over timing, process, and the canonical record is the most potent power in decentralized governance. Deciding what meets “objective criteria” when a proposal is ready, and what enters the official repository directly shapes what the community votes on. Every serious governance system recognizes this as real authority.
The procedural controversies around these proposals are public record. A neutral, competent operations body would proactively address such cited failures, not demand the community re-prove them. But since you insist, let’s recount your specific, unaddressed failures that I hope you will NOW address:
- On the Regional Council proposal v2, I provided on-chain timestamps and objective evidence straight from governance docs proving the proposal violated the minimum re-submission threshold. You replied to the very next comment in that thread, clearly saw my argument, and chose to ignore it. Could you explain this sequence of actions?
- On CGP 216-218, I tagged you directly on my delegate thread highlighting a violation: there was an explicit commitment to immediate re-submission if the vote failed quorum, which was disregarded. Can you credibly prove through governance rules or precedence that this is explicitly allowed? I received no acknowledgement.
- On CGP 216 - 218 the proposals also included the text
"No" votes will not be counted for the purpose of picking a winning choice, therefore voters can explicitly abstain by voting "no" on all three options. "No" votes do not affect quorum". This is blatantly false. No votes do count towards quorum. This statement, left uncorrected by the Guild, directly misled voters and potentially caused disenfranchisement. Why was it published? - Can you credibly prove through BOTH forum text and governance calls (recorded timestamps) that CGP 218 was discussed sufficiently to be accepted as a valid proposal? The records suggests otherwise.
The issue is concurrent financial entanglement, not familiarity with Celo. You are receiving Community Fund money through other entities while simultaneously acting as the procedural gatekeepers for proposals competing for that same pool. That is a prima facie conflict of interest. It does not require malicious intent. It does not disappear through disclosure. Conflict of interest is a binary state: either you are financially entangled with proposers, or you are not.
Your argument against reconstitution is a classic appeal to the sunk cost fallacy, used by every failing institution to avoid accountability. You list the “costs of change” but ignore the catastrophic and ongoing cost of a distrusted, conflicted governance layer: eroded community trust. If your operations are as documented and transparent as you claim, a new team should pick up the playbook. If they cannot, it proves the Guild has centralized knowledge rather than decentralized it.
You suggest that safeguards like clearer conflict rules or term limits could be added. That argument only underscores the criticism. A competent, neutral governance body would have treated strict conflict rules and rotation as foundational, not optional add-ons introduced only after public challenge. Their absence is not an accident; it is evidence of poor institutional design.
Most community members rely on the forum’s permanent, transparent record. Governance accountability must be forum-based visible to all and not on synchronous calls. More fundamentally, the Guild is asking for community funding. The burden is on the Guild to demonstrate competence and neutrality to earn that funding.