The Celo Ecosystem Treasury

[thezviad]

First, I want to preface my feedback that I am highly pro spending the community fund aggressively. (As you can see in my comments on CCF proposal too, I am generally very much in favor of getting the funds out and spent ASAP vs keeping them just sitting there).

I think to explain my point of having smaller funds instead of one large fund, Geth + alternative client work would be a good example to discuss. An effort like that definitely requires large amount of funds on its own, and if successful, should be an ongoing effort, not just a one time thing. Imo, it would work much more efficiently and effectively, if 1 or maximum 2 person team applied for funds to just run that effort specifically.

Instead of rolling that under one large fund umbrella, you would just have more focused fund that just takes care of “funding client development”.

My main point/view is that having more focus funds with smaller number of stewards (i.e. maximum 2 or 3) will allow funds to be deployed faster and more effectively. It probably would also workout better for setting up legal entities too, because you wont be mix and matching different type of funding efforts.

To reiterate though, I am always more pro-spending community fund. So if the only way to move this forward is as the proposal is written now, then I would still prefer that vs not doing anything.

[LuukDAO]

Thanks for kickstarting this initiative @Yaz and team! We as an ecosystem must indeed acknowledge the race we’re in both on a global front with a rapidly deteriorating environment and local communities needing our solutions, and the web 3.0 space to attract talent and relevant projects to our ecosystem to become the home for projects that are focussed on enabling prosperity.

However, I believe that there are more effective ways to allocate the Ecosystem Treasury instead of funneling such a large chunk through a handful of people.

I’ve helped set up the Balancer Grants DAO, which started as an autonomous unit in the Balancer Ecosystem with about $800K in funding. 6 weeks in, we’ve already learned a lot - which will surely influence how we structure this going forward. In this case - it seems 3M CELO is a lot to give up-front without any form of iteration.

My main points

• It’s not clear yet to me how this fund will be different and which role it will play in the overall Celo ecosystem. The Celo ecosystem already has multiple avenues to distribute grants/investments (Foundation, Flori, etc.), which seems to have various similarities with this program. If this Fund is geared primarily towards large projects - maybe a partnership-focused fund dedicated to primarily token swaps, and cross-ecosystem initiatives (co-funding and co-building) may be a better fit.
• Grant programs that are general and cover multiple areas often run the risk of becoming flooded with applications from a wide variety of backgrounds - making it harder to filter/coordinate with and between funding recipients. Because of the lack of support and cohesion between the program participants, the outcomes are often sub-optimal. Only a portion of projects actually reaches the point where they return value to the ecosystem.

I believe specialized programs operated through DAO-like structures are the more effective way of allocating capital. This way, the recipients will have a clear focus, close collaboration with the program stewards, and collaborate closely with cohort members.

[aaronmgdr]

I think it would be more effective to have 3 separate funds, one each for the 3 areas you specified.

Breaking it up into 3 funds will mean here is less room for assumptions to occur, and for each area to get its full due. otherwise it will be all to easy for one area to receive less funding and attention than another.

As CCF1 showed its no small task to distribute this funds to projects. Whats the commitment being made by each of the signatories? For your own sakes it would be good to get clear on that. also will there need to be any salaries or will it pro bono work? if pro bono it will be important to make sure the commitment leaves space for other work

Im not concerned with the amount and have faith in this group for a multisig. if multiple funds would even support subsets of this group for each.

[papa_raw]

I’d say this proposal could use iteration. And I hope my inputs here can help stimulate some revisions. Thoughts:

Lack of Structural Differentiation

This fund, at a glance, looks to have the same distribution structure as the other funds that currently exist for Celo — namely, an M-of-N committee review of managers issuing funding for grants on a 1-by-1 applicant basis. From my perspective, a new fund of this size that does not have a more targeted agenda should stretch a bit.

• The first item that can be played with is the trust model: M-of-N can be replaced with more sophisticated social choice mechanism for higher optimization of resource distribution. M-of-N is not very scalable, and would not necessarily be appropriate to the size of this fund. One non-mechanistic way to mediate this is through cascade funding, but cascade funding requires a pre-aligned consortia of actor-organizations to be effective (see @luuk’s comment above)

• The second way structure can be adjusted is to change the administers of the grants. Most funds have top-level persons who are poorly integrated with the development teams. By directly integrating fund managers with teams who are executing on a program, it (1) gets easier for teams to budget appropriately over time, as the fund managers can see where talent is needed or budget is missing and (2) reduces the likelihood of “mercenary workers” to not stick around the ecosystem. Keep in mind that every grant recipient who receives funding and exits the ecosystem can be understood as a sunk cost.

• The final approach here is not to release grants as lump-sum packages but instead to structure the fund more as a “bill by FTE” set-up, with a regularly established billing cycle (e.g. every 3 months). This is my bias overall towards advancing programs, as its more flexible time-wise and actors are stabilized by steady and predictable liquidity flows.

Unclear Ecosystem Strategy

It is unclear where this fund sits in relation to Celo’s current funds. How, for instance, does it relate to DeFi For The People, or the Foundation fund? It seems overall too generalized and lacking topic-specificity. A further strategic question here is whether this generalized fund is playing Game A or Game B? From my perspective, this is a distinctly Game A strategy that aims to appropriate mechanisms / primitives from Ethereum and DeFi-as-it-is, but doesn’t necessarily improve or harden Celo’s defensibility viz-a-viz other platforms (which we would expect from a Game B fund).

Defining Performance Objectives

A fund this size could benefit by setting clear KPIs in relation to the Celo ecosystem – or at the least making clear what KPIs will be measured. The amount of funding distributed is not a KPI – this is an input whose aim is to generate certain outputs. One example KPI we are playing with at Curve Labs for the purposes of an alternative Celo grant application (coming soon^tm) is to “create and experiment with localized natural capital and environmentally regenerative crypto-assets that can make up 40% of Celo’s reserve within a three year timeframe.” This is the level of specificity I’d expect for performance-setting at the top-level of any large program (as this fund is putting forth)

[j_a]

Kudos re: this proposal. The broader crypto/blockchain space is littered with examples of nascent Layer-1 ecosystems failing to fund projects urgently enough and with deeper integration with bottom-up community priorities rather than the whims of project insiders. For a nascent / struggling Layer-1 like Celo, starting with a Multisig governed by known community builders and allocated responsibly via ReleaseGold would demonstrate the ecosystem’s urgency to build an organic community beyond the core team and a commitment to decentralization in practice rather than in name only.

Addressing several of the criticisms / above comments…

On the size of the proposal

• Several commenters point out the large size of the proposal. Given Celo’s nascency in the broader landscape and the faster speed at which other ecosystems are moving, it feels unlikely that this proposal would fail by being too large and more likely that Celo will fall further behind by failing to take measured risks like this one.

• As mentioned by @cmcewen, risks created by the size of the funding can be offset by using ReleaseGold. DAOs / on-chain funding in practice tend to fail via political sclerosis/inertia, under-funding, and adversarial transparency (e.g. DeFi Education fund) / bikeshedding (e.g. gish gallop) rather than over-allocation. Given the status quo of hundreds of millions being allocated via non-transparent, insider-controlled processes, the risks seem comparably small.

• Although on-chain funding is still nascent, there are increasingly learnings to be gleaned from on-chain funding DAOs in the wild, namely programs like Uniswap Grants, Aave Grants DAO and Compound Grants. These DAOs are supporting DeFi protocols that already have product-market fit and allocate ~$1mn/quarter to their grants programs. Celo is a nascent Layer-1 protocol that is still pre-PMF and so allocating aggressively and urgently seems more attractive than getting bogged down on details / size when tools to manage risk exist. The structure of the funding lends itself to flexibility after the funding has been secured.

• As a second-order benefit, launching on-chain funding of sufficient size may be useful for attracting integrations with emerging DAO platforms on Ethereum such as Tally, Boardroom, Orca, etc. given the ease of integrating such tools due to Celo’s use of a common toolchain. Lack of established DAO infrastructure is a risk for Celo if projects would prefer to launch farming on Celo to reach more TVL and use Celo as a Ethereum Layer-2 instead of a nexus of control for their protocol.

On funding multiple groups

• @thezviad 's proposal to split the funding into multiple groups is impractical and without useful analog for a funding initiative at this stage in the lifecycle. Launch one well-functioning funding source before you launch multiple.

• The larger crypto/blockchain space is littered with failures of bureaucratic, insider-controlled foundations, so flexible (yet accountable) stewardship of the funds would be a feature not a bug here.

• Emerging DAO capabilities like Orca could make such architectures possible in the future and the goal of a DAO-of-DAOs for a Layer-1 likely makes a ton of a sense eventually.

On the relationship with other funding sources

• Some commenters (e.g. @papa_raw) question how this initiative relates to DeFi for the People or Foundation funding. These existing funding sources are not distinct. Any outsider’s immediate view of Celo is that such funding is currently managed by a common set of insiders. This is not bad in a vacuum: it lends itself to large-scale, flexible / fast-moving partnerships which can attract TVL and users to Celo and allows real competition with competitors like Ava Labs, Polygon, or Fantom.

• However it is a problem if it remains the only source of funding for the ecosystem, primarily because the calculation problem for a small group of decision-makers is too great for a permissionless Layer-1 ecosystem over the long-term.

• Although core infrastructure (e.g. ETH 2.0, Geth, ENS, etc.) is perhaps best bootstrapped and funded via Ethereum Foundation funding, how many of the top Ethereum projects have been funded in full by the Ethereum Foundation itself? I can only name Uniswap and although bootstrapped by the Ethereum Foundation, the majority of their funding has actually come via external fundraises and the launch of the UNI token, much of which now sits in a similar on-chain treasury. Quite often we see complaints about Ethereum Foundation’s challenges in retaining core developer talent and funding of key open-source teams. (Note this is not a dig on EF itself but rather their structure as an entity).

A final point

We’ve seen a number of Layer-1 ecosystems fail to gain organic traction when funding is bottlenecked in traditional corporate structures controlled by early members or opaque, dysfunctional Swiss nonprofits. The crypto/blockchain space is currently a builder’s market and capital is cheap, so inertia and risk aversion in competing for top open source talent has compounding costs as network effects accrue to competitors.

[edlovecrypto]

@Yaz

Kickstarting several independent regional-focused DAOs is another thing we plan to do in the first 90 Days.

Hey, Yaz. I am finishing my MsC degree in Computer Science at CIn/UFPE. Universities in Brazil have greatly suffered with lack of funding from the Brazilian government, because our president is a tropical Trump who does not believe in Science. Therefore, the professors at Brazilian universities are very inclined to pursuit alternative sources of funding. One idea we have been talking about to go around that is a Science Finance DAO.

Another idea is a DAO for investing in Celo Startups. A sort of Syndicate DAO powered by Celo.

If any of those ideas are interesting for the Celo Ecosystem Trasury, I would love to be involved in the conversations.

[pranay]

I agree whole-heartedly with @ViktorBunin and @j_a on two points:

• This isn’t aggressive enough
• It’s better to move fast and do something rather than bike shed forever about structure and process

Since I’m a folksy southerner, I’ll use a sports metaphor – you don’t play defense when you’re losing the ball game. You have to take big shots (Hail Mary’s) to try and get into the lead, after which you can pump the brakes and deliberate.

Celo is a Layer 1 with a great foundation and a lot of potential. But it clearly lacks awareness in the market, and has not hit escape velocity. I speak with many crypto folks who have no idea what Celo is, nor how it is different from any other EVM compatible L1. So if we can juice that awareness with a small amount of targeted spend, I’m all for it.

The main resistance points seem to be:

• governance
• differentiation from other programs

On the first point, agree that a ReleaseGold vehicle can help. But also, let’s have progressive decentralization. The 7 folks in the multi-sig above have shown their commitment to this ecosystem, and I’m not opposed to delegating to them for such a small amount of money ($15MM is peanuts in crypto – Terra just contributed $150MM to Cosmos), and then having them decentralize into a DAO or whatever over time.

On the second point, this proposal already feels more differentiated from the others because it is emergent and bootstrapped by the community. If there are too many programs with overlapping scope, why don’t we measure performance 6m-1y down the road, and sunset the one that performs the worst? Feels more meritocratic that way and gives community-generated programs a chance to succeed. Plus, the worst outcome is the Celo ecosystem spends a little bit more money – that feels like an ok loss compared than sitting on our hands and wondering why nobody knows about Celo

I am strongly for this proposal, and would advocate moving fast and funding things.

[deepak]

@Yaz

https://github.com/celo-org/governance/blob/main/CGPs/cgp-0038.md

I wanted to add some of my thoughts on the proposal. I am also including some comments and discussion I have had within CCF and other leaders + community members within the Celo community.

I am fully in support of the initiative to start using the funds and put them to good use - accelerate the tech development within Celo as well as help contribute towards decentralization.

I want to raise a few concerns and questions around the operations and management of the fund. I think these are some gaps that is generating the concerns among many people about why the funding amount it too high.

• Community engagement: The proposal feels a little out of the blue at least to the community. For instance, before making the CCF proposal - I personally had about 7+ 1:1 conversations with leaders in Celo ecosystem and later we hosted at least 3 different community calls where we presented our plan, asked for feedback, and also asked volunteers to join us. Even with this I had a few people complaining that they didn’t get to participate. Of course the suggestion is not to do this but a longer Q&A session beyond how much time you would get during governance call would be helpful to build trust and face time with the community

• Smaller Amount: With such a big ask, my concern is that it’ll be super hard to deploy these funds in the hands of the right team/project. It has not been easy to for CCF to find strong teams that are mission aligned. I suspect that will be the case for the treasury too but I don’t know. I would be comfortable with a 1MM CELO ask, spend it, and then do this bigger ask. If you are in fact able to deploy it, I think it makes sense to engage the community for another vote to do the 2nd ask. By then you would have proven yourselves.
  Another way to alleviate this concern could be to be more specific around the teams/projects who you would give this money to. It could be $1MM to company X to improve Geth or $2MM to company Y to build a Rust Celo client, etc.

• Commitment: It’s unclear how much time commitment the multisig holders would be doing. Also, what is the status of your current roles. Would you’ll be still working at your jobs and doing this part-time? Will this role be part of your current role in your respective companies? etc

• Operations and management: While we can’t really predict a lot of things ahead there are still some things that you can prepare for. With the ask for 3M CELO (>$15MM) at today’s prices, I would expect at least a few of the multisig owners would be doing this full time or at least half time. In addition to that, having plans for 1-2 full time operations managers (without multisig access) would be beneficial to support you’ll so that you can focus on get work done and hire somebody to help with the paperwork.

• Entity Structuring: Trust me there will be lot of legal, financial, and contractual work that goes into these things. If you are running it purely as a DAO, how will the contractual agreements work? You will still need some sort of legal entity to sign contracts and use that to ensure that the work is being done as promised by the grantees, etc. For instance, we thought CCF would take a month to create but took us ~5+ months to create the structure and start deploying the funds. Now we still spend quite a lot of time doing agreements and paper work with our CCF teams.

These are some off the top of mind points I can think of. TLDR: I love this initiative. Need more clarity around people commitments. Would like to see more transparency. More specifics around grantees, operations, and structure of the treasury.

[nambrot]

Love the engagement here! I think there is general agreement, even if it might not sound that way:

1. These funds need to be deployed aggressively and we should avoid getting bogged down by process.
2. How they are deployed is uncertain, especially at start, and in light of uncertainty folks understandably a more cautious.

It seems to me that the path we have taken with CCF1 and now CET is a lot of upfront discussion to make folks at ease with the relatively-large-for-Celo/relatively-small-to-industry sums. I wonder if the alternative is the following:

• Start with relatively small amounts (<= $1M) and mostly focus on the general trustworthiness of the stewards (which IMO clearly applies here), and avoid a lot of the bike shedding.
• After 3-6 months, document what has happened and ask for follow-on funding

IMO, this gets us to a world where these funds are deployed sooner than later. We clearly lack targets for these funds and folks finding those, so I have a hard time believing that we as the community wouldn’t continually fund folks who want to step up. As we see with CCF1, it is actually quite hard to spend the funds, so going with this model sets a nice precedent for more folks to do so by lowering the initial barrier.

[sep]

Hi All,

I love this robust discussion, and I agree with @nambrot that I think there is a fair amount of agreement just beneath the surface.

Let me summarize the key arguments and propose a synthesis that I feel maintains the intention and key details of the original proposal while integrating the feedback of the community.

Summary of community feedback:

1. A number of thoughtful arguments (for example, by @pranay and @viktorbunin) have been made that we should be investing in the ecosystem more aggressively, and should avoid dallying or bikeshedding.

2. A number of thoughtful arguments have been made (for example, by @kobigurk, @papa_raw, @luukdao) for milestone-based funding and more detail in the initial proposal, including clear performance objectives.

3. A number of thoughtful arguments have been made (for example, by @thezviad and @aaronmgdr) that multiple, smaller funds can be more nimble and also provide a template for future use of the community fund.

Synthesis:

The synthesis that I will offer below rests on a couple of observations:

1. These arguments are not actually in conflict with one another. For example, it is possible with the right design to invest aggressively and avoid bikeshedding, while at the same time having clear performance objectives and milestones.

2. Many of the thoughtful ideas that have been brought up in this discussion already exist in a nascent form in the original proposal. Therefore, it should be straightforward to flesh them out, and doing so would strengthen rather than compromise the original proposal.

Part 1 of Synthesis: Fleshing out initiatives and target outcomes of the proposal.

To address the concerns around more detail in the initial proposal (including clear performance objectives), I had a conversation with @Yaz and took notes.

While the original proposal had 3 core initiatives, if we look closely, the second initiative (Radical Experimentation and Emerging Markets) was actually two distinct initiatives. So I’ll organize the below by detailing a mission and target outcomes of 4 core initiatives. All credit here goes to Yaz; I just asked questions and typed up the summary.

Initiative 1: Open-source Projects ($4m)

Mission:

• to generate developer interest in Celo at a core level, and position Celo as a central player in the EVM community

Target Outcomes:

By 2 years from now:

• To have at least 50 people attending governance calls regularly
• Have at least half of people attending governance calls be non-cLabbers

Examples:

• Double down on identity research
• Push forward cryptography for privacy and compression
• Push forward an EIP that we can sponsor
• Improve EVM for things that are useful to Celo
• Support projects like Geth, Erigon, Hyperledger Besu

Radical Experimentation ($3m)

Mission:

To increase community by pushing the envelope technically and making people say “wow, Celo is doing really cool things and I want to be involved with that community.”

Target Outcomes:

By 2 years from now:

• Bring the 5 most innovative, underfunded projects in crypto to Celo (for example, kyc-compliant privacy; novel ideas for real-world adoption like kong.cash; we’ll ask the community for what they want to see)
• Bring at least 3 innovative new ideas to bolster stability
• Bring the 10 most innovative independent core developers to Celo (for example, people like Or Neeman)
• Introduce at least 1 new standard (for example, erc20 contracts with allocation of transaction fees to reserve)

Global markets ($4m)

Mission:

To have local autonomy in each country where Celo has a presence, by funding a DAO where the eco-lead and local crypto thought partners / influencers can make decisions on bootstrapping a Celo ecosystem in that country.

Target Outcomes:

By 2 years from now, for each country where Celo has an Eco Lead

• Have at least 10 technical projects funded per country, built on Celo, that would otherwise not exist, at least 1 of each of them becoming major projects in the community.
• Have the top 10 university communities be aware of and excited about Celo because of a university event/hackathon funded by the Dao

Developing Crypto-Native Community around Celo ($4m)

Mission:

Encourage the community to create more community-led projects by sponsoring hackathons, college blockchain club events, holding crypto-native community-building functions (example, League of Bridges) and providing support to all those who come.

Target Outcomes:

By 2 years from now:

• Have 3 new externally proposed CGPs
• Have 5 new non-country-specific DAOs on Celo with substantive engagement (social daos, investment daos for celo ecosystem, mission-related DAOs e.g. regenerative finance DAOs)
• In countries where there are large crypto developer communities and Celo has a large presence, but no eco-lead (for example, US, Germany),
  • Have a talk at the top 20 college blockchain clubs
  • Have 5 celo hackathons
  • Have 25 new projects built on Celo arising from hackathons/college blockchain talks, at least 5 of which become major projects in the community.

Part 2 of Synthesis: Addressing remaining feedback.

Once a mission and target outcomes like the above are set, it makes it more straightforward to address the remaining concerns:

Addressing concerns about size of fund by returning overages and having a quarter-point and mid-point checkin:

A few people expressed concerns about the size of the fund being too big. I would interpret this concern as follows:

1. Without clear target outcomes, $15mm is a large blank check.
2. If the price of Celo goes substantially up over the next two years, this can be a much larger fund than initially intended.
3. If the fund is clearly going in a bad direction early on, the community shouldn’t be locked in to putting good money after bad.

Point 1 is already addressed with the mission and target outcomes articulated above. Point 2 can be easily addressed, by making clear that this is intended to be a $15mm proposal, and if the price of Celo goes up, the fund will return the overage. And point 3 can also be easily addressed, by having a quarter-point and midpoint checkin, where the proposers give an update to the community, and the community can vote to stop it if it is going in a clearly bad direction.

Addressing concerns about community involvement vs. bikeshedding by open solicitations for ideas 2x / year:

Some people wanted more community involvement, and others were concerned that it would lead to interminable discussions and slowing down investment. These two concerns can be synthesized by a simple process where each initiative makes an open call for ideas from the community within the scope of the target outcomes 2 times per year. For example, for radical experimentation, the team can source project ideas themselves, and also solicit ideas from the community of what kinds of projects in the domain of radical ideas the community would like to see funded.

Importantly, the multisig should not need to come to consensus within the community at this level of detail; this runs the very real risk of slowing things down. Rather, it should simply solicit ideas and integrate them as they see fit.

Addressing the concerns about one large fund versus a few smaller funds:

I feel like this one can be easily synthesized, because in practice, this fund is actually 4 subfunds. And given the scope of each of these 4 initiatives, each member of the proposer team will likely specialize in a couple of the initiatives and act as an advisor to the other initiatives.

One can make that clear in the structure by having a parent DAO with a 5-of-7 (or 7-of-9) multisig, and then having smaller subDAOs for each of the initiatives with a 2-of-3 (or 3-of-5) multisig.

One benefit of this structure is that the size and scope of the subDAOs can be a template for other groups who would like to steward portions of the community fund. While it would be difficult for me to see many $15mm funds right now, I can see a number of $3-4mm community funds (for example, around stability, regenerative finance, specific use cases, etc).

One last thought:

This fund I think would be even stronger if we had clearly more non-cLabs people on the parent multisig than cLabs people, as it would then be more clearly a community fund. I chatted with Jarrell and he mentioned that he had one or two people in mind who are strong, mission-aligned, and interested.

TL;DR

My vote would be to move forward with the original proposal, with the following small tweaks that would meaningfully integrate the feedback of the community:

• The intended timeframe of the fund is 2 years.
• The fund’s 4 initiatives have clear missions, target outcomes, and funding targets as described in Part 1 of the Synthesis above.
• Each initiative acts as a subDAO of the parent DAO.
• Each initiative will solicit ideas from the broader community 1-2 times per year. These solicitations should be ways to get a broad range of ideas from the community, but they should not be voting or consensus opportunities. This allows community engagement while staying nimble.
• For each initiative, there will be a quarter-point and mid-point checkin, at which point the community can vote to not continue with an initiative if they feel it’s going in a bad direction. If the community votes to discontinue an initiative, the remaining allocation is returned to the community fund.
• This is intended to be a $15mm initiative, if the price of Celo goes up to a point that would have more than $15mm deployed, the excess gets returned to the community fund.
• Ideally, there would be 1-2 more people not affiliated with cLabs on the parent multisig, so that it is clearly a community fund.

[sep]

And one more note: It has been a pleasure to follow this and see the thoughtfulness of everybody in this discussion; both the original proposers and the community giving feedback. It makes me excited for the future of Celo to see this level of thoughtfulness and engagement across the community.

[aaronmgdr]

support this 100%

lets put it on the blockchain vote

[Pinotio.com]

Congrats on pulling this together @Yaz .

• I support getting funds out there flexibility and in large amount.
• I also support @sep 's points around a) trying to get more non cLabs sigs (or at least commit to cycling them out) - it would be ideal to have just one or two cLabs on the multi-sig within a 1-2 year time frame, b) returning funds over $15M - I think this is bold and wise.

In terms of prioritisation I’ve summarised in this cLabs priorities post some areas I think Celo can excel at: cLabs Product Priorities - #2 by Pinotio.com

[Yaz]

Update to the CET Proposal
Hi folks, we would like announce updates to the CET Proposal ever since the Governance Call has taken place.

• We have updated the proposal to include the Multisig address and the addresses of each of the 9 owners of the multisig contract.
• We have bumped the hours worked to 40 hours given new multisig owners plus feedback from community during the call to be more flexible on hours worked and not being too constrained. The 40 hours will be the total of the entire CET multisig owners, not each individual owner.
• We will be reaching out to the law firm discussed during the call to move ahead and publish any analysis after we finalize our agreement with them to the community.
• The JSON file of the governance proposal is on the updated CGP draft.
• We added another risk section and how to mitigate it.

We are getting closer to moving this to on-chain voting!

[Yaz]

Hi everyone!

A brief update on the CET proposal: we are submitting the CGP to Mainnet tomorrow! We look forward to having you all participate in voting on this proposal and help grow the future of Celo’s promising ecosystem.

[aaronmgdr]

Im Curious how Things have progressed since the Governance Proposal was approved.

[Yaz]

Hi Aaron, we are working on an update, lot’s of exciting things we want to share with y’all. I will keep this forum thread updated on the unveiling of the Treasury and what we are up to plus have a community call.

[Yaz]

@aaronmgdr here’s our first post and update, we have renamed it to Ocelot , which stands for Original Celo Treasury.

We will have a community call next week, details in the post.

The Ocelot Is Out The Bag

OCELOT ✨🐆✨

[Pinotio.com]

Thanks @Yaz . Funky! I like it, and the key is to get stuff done and I’m cheering you all on.

Question: Second Blockchain Client - does that mean an alternative to Forno?

Random idea: Could be cool to develop/support a way for dApps to easily support more languages, especially those in countries where CELO issues more cUSD.

Other thoughts:

• Pushing for and aligning around a schedule for the issuance of new cStables.
• Making it easy for dApps to onboard on/off ramp solutions for those emerging markets you have as priorities.
• Maybe pay advisors in CELO. Some of them might sell it, but some will probably hold it, so it could get CELO in the hands of more good hodlers, which I think is good for alignment and also reduces sell pressure on CELO.