[DRAFT] Creation of the Celo Delegate Program

Ecosystem
21

I have some concerns with this proposal.

First, some clarification.

It’s also interesting to note that since inception, it has never occurred that a proposal didn’t pass due to receiving more No votes than Yes votes. In the current setup, stakeholders are incentivized not to vote on a proposal they may consider unfavorable and hope that the proposal will not reach a quorum and fail.

Another way of looking at this, is that every proposal requires a minimum of yes votes to pass, so proposals not passing can’t be blamed on No voters holding out.

Now about the actual proposal, I think this is actually dangerous. Once delegates hold voting power of tokens they do not own, there is no incentives for them not to vote in their own favor. I think this makes the Compound attack actually more likely, in this case triggered by the delegates. I think 10m Celo is way too big of a number, as they could very easily vote out the ˜15M active votes we currently have.

Second, I do not think that the delegates should be chosen by a multisig. This is a risk becase (a) the tokens will have to be transfered from Celo Governance to the multisig and (b) it will be at the discretion of the multisig to chose who the delegators are, effectively having the voting power under their control. Celo Governance will not even have the power to reclaim these tokens without code changes, or stalling the network, if the multisig doesn’t sign.

The protocol could chose who to delegate using standard governance proposals and people get voted in/out by Celo holders. I can’t think of a reason why this would be a problem.

The idea of having an on-chain governance is that the power is in Celo holders hands. This proposal fundamentally changes that and put a lot of power in a group of people with disproportionate low skin in the game, and I find that unfair and counterproductive. If the goal is to increase participation, then we can think about that without diluting existing holders power.

Views are my own only.

4 Likes
22

I disagree, because this heavily punishes people who don’t want to delegate.

1 Like
23

Hi Martin,

  1. The proposal suggests 5M, not 10M CELO. Even when taking 10m, your logic of 10m being able to easily outvote 15m active voters doesn’t add up.

  2. Delegation is a feature that has proven to increase active governance participation and decision-making in DAOs. I don’t agree with the view that the only way to make good decisions is to force people to own a relative $ value of a specific token.

  3. The Multi-sig does not choose the delegates; Celo Governance will approve the delegate’s decision. However, given that we won’t use stCELO anymore, we may be able to allocate the Delegated tokens through onchain governance.

The setup above, where we have Celo Governance lock and delegate, would be better than a multi-sig manually doing that. I will explore this today!

24

Hi Juan!

  1. After @martinvol’s comment, I think the best way (which I will validate if possible today) is to lock and delegate from the Celo Community Treasury natively. Hence, we do not need any group to lead the admin anymore!
  2. Agreed that longer discussion stages could be helpful. In most cases, 14-15 days seems like a healthy minimum.
  3. 5M delegates would equal about 24% of the current CELO in the Community Treasury. However, your point does bring up the relevance of completing the Mento Reserve: Returning Celo to increase the number of CELO under community control, ideally before CEL2 launches. After completing the six tranches for the 10m cUSD, Mento still has 82,406,987 CELO to be returned to the Celo Community Treasury. I suggest starting a conversation about the timeline and process to complete this transfer soon!
3 Likes
25

Yeah this makes sense, it can be managed directly via governance without a middleman. It does however include a whole bunch of governance to vote in the delegates themselves, which, since we’ve seen a lot of voter apathy in the past, could be difficult getting them all over the line. I can’t see pushing through 5-10 governance proposals for each delegate being a smooth process, unless they are all dropped at once:

CGP-123 - Delegate 1M CELO to John Doe
CGP-124 - Delegate 1M CELO to Jane Doe
etc

Perhaps we could bundle the governance proposal, with delegates proposed and discussed on the forum here first, then a once-off payload that sets them all up.

Would be good to have the payloads ready to retract the delegation for each user individually also (as drafts) so they can be switched off easily if they don’t participate. Although ironically, the delegates themselves could turn into a cartel and aggressively “No” vote any future changes that releases their voting power. If we use direct governance how do we prevent this from happening?

I echo the idea that the discussion stage for this and all governance proposals should be much, much longer. I think 30 days is a minimum for larger and complicated proposals, give stakeholders time to browse the forum.

4 Likes
26

Yes, I do imagine the selection to happen before submission by a small team and a final suggestion of the 10 delegates with rational for each + an estimation on their collective impact (and how they are a good representation + contribution to governance) based on public info to be submitted as 1 proposal.

3 Likes
27

Thanks for this. I am in support of this initiative and will be applying as one of the delegates to be considered should the program pass.

Looking forward to what is next!!

1 Like
28

  1. sorry misswrote 10M instead of 5M. I think my point remains, because in case of a controversial proposal 5M is a significant tie breaker, the amount of effort someone needs to do reduces significantly. Activist investors in the public markets are considered a threat even when they have 3% of voting power. It also doesn’t make sense to me that 15M of active votes can vote to give themselves (or someone that benefits their interest) 5M more.

  2. I agree delegation is important, but it has to come from Celo that is rightly owned. We could turn this proposal into a program to get more whales to delegate (or to be more engaged with governance FWIW).

  3. The Governance is very bad at making non-binary decisions, like a list of people to delegate, so however has the authority to control the list effectively has a big change of controlling the votes. Yes we can make a process for that, but eventually every criteria used would benefit/punish someone and thus who has influence in creating the process can heavily influence the delegators.

Sorry about pointing out all the ways that this can go wrong, but I think we’ve seen way too many horror stories in crypto to hand 1/3 of active voting power to people with disproportionally low skin in the game.

3 Likes
29

Thanks for this thoughtful proposal @LuukDAO! Few questions/comments:

  1. For the delegate application, are you only accepting individuals or could this be done as a group? For eg. @Philfog and I would like to together serve as one delegate.
  2. I echo @martinvol’s concerns and think there is a strategic approach to this. Given that “Quorum needed for proposals is dynamic and depends on previous number of votes on recent proposals [from Celo docs]” perhaps each delegate could start with a smaller amount of CELO, then as the increased participation raises the quorum threshold each delegate receives more CELO from the earmarked total 5M [or X% of net voting power]? This approach uses the “quorum threshold” number as the concrete north star or KPI we are improving.
  3. Do @Thylacine or anyone know an easy way to export on-chain voting data into a .csv [from Mondo or the CLI or otherwise]? I think it’s worth doing a quick analysis for @martinvol’s point #2 above - identifying dormant whales who have stopped participating and other trends that can ground this proposal in concrete metrics.
2 Likes
30

Maybe this could help (there’s csv option to export data from any dune query via API):
https://dune.com/tomfutago/celo-governance/

3 Likes
31

Completely agree, I am also in favor to standard governance proposals for picking up delegators.

This is a high risk, thats why I raised the concerns at the beggining of this discussion and suggest a different Multisign structure including the Approvers, but obviously is prefer not to have this funds in any Multisign.

I don’t think it punishes people that don’t want to delegate, they just can decide not to delegate, I was proposing to count delegations on delegates to be signal of community interest in that delegate. But anyway, thats not relevant at this point of the discussion. I am more in favor of your points.

That make sense maybe, but not exclusively I think people can come any time to the forum and propose theirselves to be a delegate.

But also I think the possibility to be listed as a delegate should remain open to anyone via CeloMondo making a PullRequest and submit their profile to be listed as a delegate, community can decide on who to delegate their voting power.

The process we are discussing here is to delegate tokens from the community fund to delegates.

Agree :point_down:

Agree :point_down:

Disagree. :point_down:
Maybe anyone can submit their own proposal and let voters decide.

Agree also with all @martinvol last comments

I am also fully agree with this idea :point_down:

1 Like
32

We’re new to the Celo forum—I recently had the chance to talk with Luuk, who mentioned this program, and it’s what brought us here.

@LuukDAO Thank you for sharing the draft proposal for the Celo Delegate Program! I think this is a great initiative that aligns perfectly with the goal of strengthening Celo’s governance. We’ve seen similar approaches work well in other DAOs, and it’s exciting to see this being proposed here.

The selection process you’ve outlined is clear, which is great. It might be helpful to consider how to ensure a good mix of expertise and perspectives among the delegates. It’s also awesome to see transparency and delegate responsibilities emphasized. The focus on increasing voter participation and transparency is key, and exploring additional ways to encourage broader participation could be beneficial, such as adding incentives or tools that make it easier and more rewarding for everyone to get involved.

I’m also curious about how the KPIs mentioned—like increasing forum feedback, voter numbers, CELO votes cast, voter argumentation, and transparency—will be tracked and measured over time. Accurate tracking is crucial for understanding the program’s impact. This is something Curia Lab could assist with, as we have alot of experiences working with these kind of data analytics. We’re really looking forward to seeing how this proposal comes together and still exploring how we can contribute to the Celo community, whether it’s sharing insights or offering support!

3 Likes
33

Hey @nirvaan,

  1. Yes, delegation is almost always assigned to a specific person for increased clarity and accountability. If both of you want to be a delegate, I think each of you should create a separate delegate profile.
  2. I imagine that in practice, this would be difficult and costly to execute. 5M is less than 1% of CELO circulating supply and about 20-30% of current voting turnouts, so it would likely not significantly affect Quorums.
  3. I sadly don’t have a simple solution here - but I would LOVE to have the largest whales identify their identity/alignment somehow. I can (manually) make a list of top voting addresses if that helps!
34

Thanks, everyone, for the thoughtful comments and input.

From my POV - it’s critical to move on this now, as the current voting landscape of Celo Governance, with 2-3 whales who aren’t publicly identified nor leave forum comments moving the majority of outcomes is suboptimal.

Delegating Celo to existing and new delegates with a proven track record participating in onchain governance will likely increase the overall quality of governance discourse and voting in Celo. There are always trade-offs when making Governance changes and programs like this, but after conversations with various stakeholders I believe there is sufficient reason to give the formation of a Delegate program a shot.

Given the locking and delegation can be executed through an onchain vote - we won’t need a multi-sig - and I propose the following flow:

  • Until September 8th, anyone who wants to become a delegate can create a Mondo profile and kickstart their delegate thread.
  • A small committee of three people (I propose to have one Guardian, one Steward, and one Foundation member) will select 10 delegates that all three of the committee members feel are a good balance and representation.
  • To kickstart an initial Celo Delegate program, a proposal will be submitted to Celo Goverance that suggests 10 delegates and their addresses, as well as a JSON that executes the locking/delegation of the CELO.
2 Likes
35

Hello, Celo Community!

I am XiaoLou, an experienced web3 developer from China. With great enthusiasm and commitment to the Celo ecosystem, I am applying to become a community representative.

As a technical expert with extensive experience in the blockchain field, I deeply resonate with Celo’s vision of creating a more inclusive financial system. Over the past period, I have been actively engaged in Celo’s Chinese community, answering technical questions, facilitating knowledge exchange, and working to expand Celo’s influence among Chinese developers.

My goal is to leverage my technical background and cross-cultural communication skills to build a bridge between Eastern and Western exchanges within the Celo community. As a potential representative, I commit to carefully evaluating each proposal, especially those involving technological innovation and ecosystem development. I believe my technical expertise will play a crucial role in assessing these proposals.

I firmly believe that through our collective efforts, we can create a more prosperous and inclusive Celo ecosystem. I look forward to the opportunity to become a community representative and contribute to Celo’s future.

I have already submitted my application to become a delegate.
Let’s work together to realize Celo’s vision!

1 Like
36

While I understand the urgency to address the current challenges in Celo Governance, it’s important that we don’t rush this process.

Effective and lasting governance improvements require careful consideration and broad community involvement. By taking the time to ensure that our approach is transparent and inclusive, we can build a stronger and more resilient governance structure that benefits the entire community.

Here’s an alternative approach:

  1. Open Registration on Celo Mondo: Allow anyone interested to register as a delegate by submitting a PR, in line with Celo Mondo’s design.

  2. Community Delegation: The community should delegate their CELO to the candidates they support, signaling their trust. To avoid gaming the system, these tokens could be locked for three months.

  3. Top 10 Delegates: The top 10 delegates, based on community support, would receive additional delegation from the Celo Community Fund, amplifying their influence.

  4. Regular Reassessment: Regularly reassess (e.g., every three months) and reallocate the top-up based on updated community signals.

If a committee is strictly necessary and unavoidable, it should be formed within the Governance Scope and not a committee of just 3 people.

The committee should consist of all Celo Governance Guardians, who are already responsible for managing governance, serve as trusted advisors, and have no vested interests in influencing delegate selection.

While CeloPG Stewards play a vital role in the Public Goods initiative, they are not directly involved in Governance. However, having one of them as a representative on the committee could be valuable—perhaps someone like you, @Luuk.

Additionally, including a representative from the Celo Foundation, such as @annaalexa, could provide broader oversight, considering Eric’s heavy workload.

However, the committee’s role should focus on verifying requirements, guiding, and supporting community-driven decisions or signals, rather than selecting the top 10 delegates to boost with Celo. It’s important that the community decides who the delegates to boost are, ensuring a fair and transparent process.

Finally, anyone on the committee should still have the opportunity to be a delegate, keeping the selection process open and community-driven.

37

Hello everyone, first time posting. Glad to be here.

I’m excited to apply to the delegate program if this passes. I would like to add to the conversation that if we are concerned about possibly rushing this process or having poor incentive alignment, you could require some upfront capital to be locked at some proportion to the delegation received. This could be poor because it raises the barrier to entry on something that should be accessible to everyone though. I think it is worth mentioning nonetheless.

Additionally, if we are worried about inactivity, we could explore ranked delegation. This was an idea brought up at SBC where a list of delegates are chosen and if a delegate performs poor on a participation metric, the delegated voting power is redistributed to the others in the ranked delegation. Though again, this is highly experimental.

38

I appreciate the thoughtfulness behind your suggestions, and I fully agree with the principle that we must not rush the governance process. Indeed, achieving effective and lasting governance improvements requires careful consideration, broad community involvement, and transparency.

That said, I’d like to address a few aspects of your alternative approach:

  1. On the importance of deliberate governance: I wholeheartedly agree that governance improvements should be carefully considered and inclusive. This is crucial for building a resilient structure that serves the community in the long term. Rushing can lead to unintended consequences, and the governance decisions we make today will have lasting impacts.
  2. Regarding delegate registration on Celo Mondo: It’s important to note that individuals can already register as delegates on Celo Mondo, regardless of whether this specific proposal moves forward.
  3. On the dynamics of delegation and voting power: A critical point to consider is the behavior of large, active voters. These stakeholders often have strong incentives to retain their voting power rather than delegate it, as this power is closely tied to their influence in the ecosystem. Your approach could inadvertently reinforce existing power structures, as those with significant funds may buy CELO to delegate to themselves, thus manipulating the system to remain at the top of the leaderboard. Once they receive delegation from the Celo Community Fund, there’s a risk that they might sell the CELO they acquired, turning governance into a pay-to-play scenario. This would be counterproductive to our goals of fairness and true decentralization.
  4. On the proposed 3-month lock: While the idea of a lock-up period aims to mitigate gaming, it’s not entirely clear how this would increase fairness or prevent manipulation. A lock might deter some short-term gaming, but it doesn’t fundamentally address the potential for wealth concentration to distort delegate selection. We need to think carefully about how such mechanisms might play out in practice.
  5. Regarding regular reassessment: The idea of reassessing delegation every three months is well-intentioned, but it introduces significant operational overhead. Each reassessment would likely require governance voting, which could become cumbersome and detract from the efficiency of our governance processes. We need to balance regular oversight with the need for a pragmatic approach that doesn’t bog down the system.
  6. On the committee composition: I agree that a committee could be a pragmatic and realistic way forward. Including a mix of 1 Celo Foundation member, 1 Celo Steward, and 3 Celo Guardians as suggested by you @0xj4an-work or a committee composed by a mix of 1 Celo Foundation member, 1 Celo Steward, and 1 Celo Guardian as suggested by @LuukDAO
39

Thank you for highlighting this important point. I agree that the core issue of potential manipulation exists regardless of whether we use delegation or direct voting through token locking. Large token holders can indeed influence voting power distribution in both scenarios.

However, I believe we can address this concern by focusing on the leaderboard mechanism itself, rather than changing the fundamental voting structure. As you suggested, we could implement a more sophisticated ranking system that goes beyond simple token quantity. Some potential approaches include:

  1. Multi-dimensional scoring: Incorporating factors such as participation rate, proposal quality, and community contributions.
  2. Time-weighted metrics: Encouraging long-term engagement over short-term manipulation.
  3. Categorized leaderboards: Separating participants into different classes (e.g., individuals, institutions, projects) with separate rankings.
  4. Dynamic adjustments: Regularly updating the ranking algorithm based on network activity and participation levels.

These modifications to the leaderboard mechanism could help mitigate the risk of manipulation while still maintaining the benefits of the delegation system. By creating a more nuanced and comprehensive ranking system, we can better reflect true engagement and contributions to the ecosystem, rather than just raw token holdings.

This approach allows us to address the concern you raised without fundamentally altering the voting structure, potentially offering a more balanced solution that encourages participation while safeguarding against undue concentration of power.

40

Your points are all admirable and might makes sense, but I would like to stress out again the fact that we should go in a direction that is technically feasible with the tech stack we are currently using today.

1 Like